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ABSTRACT 
Chanil Boo: Essays on When More is More and Less is Less: Marketing Investments and 
Productivity, Firm Value, and Stock Market 
(Under the direction of William P. Putsis) 
 
 Understanding marketing accountability has been of great interest to business scholars 
and practitioners. To obtain deeper insights, I investigate the links between marketing 
investments, marketing productivity, and firm value. I specifically focus on a merger and 
acquisition where both budget and productivity adjust to align with marketing strategy. I use 
mergers as a context for the investigation of the dynamic and outcomes of marketing as a 
financial investment. As such, the empirical approach and managerial implication are not limited 
to mergers and acquisitions. The results can be extended to other circumstances, such as 
managerial change and any economic or structural shocks (for example, divestitures, IPO, SEO, 
alliances, and joint ventures) and to other strategic decisions of a firm under the circumstances in 
which the necessity of aggressive marketing competes with financial inflexibility.  
 In Essay 1, I design a test and then provide empirical evidence that enhances a discussion 
as to when and how a firm’s marketing investments affect its firm value. In particular, the study 
focuses on two aims: 1) the relation between post-merger marketing spend and a firm’s financial 
market performance, and 2) the path through which marketing affects stock prices. Marketing 
studies have emphasized that information is not a separate factor in determining and executing 
marketing strategy of a firm (Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009; Steenkamp and Fang 2011; Kurt 
and Hulland 2013). The relationship between information and firm performance is central to any 
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marketing strategy, and a key to this is that marketing delivers relevant information to the 
investors. However, what studies leave less explored is the empirical measurement and test of 
information asymmetry that has a decisive effect on marketing investment and firm value. To 
address this, I estimate the degree and effects information asymmetry has on returns to marketing 
investments in a merger, a natural setting where information asymmetry is most likely to exhibit 
the greatest effect on the relation between a firm and investors. 
 In Essay 2, I design a test and then provide empirical evidence that enhances a discussion 
as to how marketing managers should allocate their marketing investments, while considering a 
firm’s marketing productivity and firm value. In particular, the study focuses on two aims: 1) the 
sources and effects of merger-induced changes in marketing productivity, and 2) the link 
between marketing and other functions of a firm in creating competitive advantage. Despite a 
number of attempts at modeling marketing credibility, comprehensive approaches are lacking 
duet to several challenges to estimating marketing productivity that researchers face (Dutta et al. 
1999; Rust et al. 2004; Narasimhan et al. 2006). The dearth of research in this area is primarily 
because most studies have only emphasized discrete facets of marketing productivity. As such, 
empirical analysis, which would provide a marketing manager with holistic assessment and 
diagnosis and also implementable guidelines, are needed. To address this, I estimate the degree 
and effects changes in marketing productivity has on firm value in a merger, while providing 
accounts of multi-faceted aspects of marketing productivity and taking into account the effect of 
other functional areas such as R&D and operation.  
 In Essay 3, I design a test and then provide empirical evidence that enhances a discussion 
as to what factors drive post-merger marketing investment decisions. In particular, the study 
focuses on two aims: 1) the relation between the stock market and a firm’s marketing investment, 
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and 2) the path through which stock prices affects marketing. Marketing studies have 
emphasized that past stock return and volatility are critical factors in determining marketing 
strategy of a firm (Mizik and Jacobson 2007; Chakravarty and Grewal 2011). However, the 
evidence has shown mixed results regarding whether the increase or decrease in marketing 
investments is a consequence of financial market performance. Prior research has been unable to 
provide an unambiguous explanations because there are incentives working to promote both 
“increase” and “decrease” investment in order to enhance firm value. To address this, I estimate 
the degree and effects the stock return and stock volatility at the time of a merger announcement 
have on the acquirers’ investment patterns in marketing and R&D post-merger. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Research Question and Motivation 
Do firms invest too many (or too few) resources into their marketing and R&D? Can 
firm-level investment be improved by re-allocating marketing and R&D spending? Given the 
power of marketing and R&D for firm growth and financial success, the answers to these 
questions are crucial. Because there are incentives working to promote both “over” and “under” 
investment in marketing and R&D, prior research has been unable to provide an unambiguous 
answer to the question: What are the financial effects when firms reconfigure their marketing and 
R&D spending? Extant literature attempts to answer this question by directly estimating the rate 
of return to marketing and R&D in models of productivity growth on measures of discretionary 
budgets. However, the evidence, both quantitative and qualitative, has shown mixed results 
regarding the benefits of discretionary expenditure (for a summary, see Rust et al. 2004). This is 
particularly true as it pertains to the impact of a merger or acquisition (M&A), where the optimal 
level of expenditure shifts and “street pressure” often permeates and influences short run 
behavior. Thus, the question remains; precisely how much of a change in marketing and/or R&D 
expenditure is due to a rational response by managers to change overall spending in response to 
efficiency gains post-merger and how much is myopic in nature, responding to street pressure for 
short-term performance? Disentangling these effects and answering these questions are the focus 
of this dissertation. 
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1.2 Research Framework 
Marketing accountability is of great interest to both business scholars and practitioners. 
Previous studies have investigated returns to marketing in a specific context, such as contractions, 
equity issuing events (e.g., initial public offerings and seasoned equity offering), and product 
recalls (Gao et al. 2015; Kurt and Hulland 2013; Steenkamp and Fang 2011). These studies have 
focused on two aims: 1) whether and how “shocks” affect a firm’s marketing metrics, and 2) 
whether and how marketing investment is associated with a firm’s performance. This dissertation 
advances the literature by explicitly estimating a firm’s productivity and by investigating its 
impacts on firm value. Although the current dissertation focuses on these issues within the 
context of a merger, the methodological approach and empirical findings may be widely applied.  
Mergers and acquisitions are strategic decisions that are made to maximize a company's 
growth through the optimization of production and marketing operations (King et al. 2004). An 
entrepreneur may grow their business either by internal expansion or by external expansion. In 
the case of internal expansion, a firm grows gradually over time in the normal course of the 
business, through the development of new assets and the establishment of new lines of products. 
On the other hand, in external expansion, a firm acquires a running business and grows overnight 
through corporate combinations. These combinations are in the form of mergers or acquisitions, 
and have become popular under the quickly changing globalized economy, where competition is 
enhanced and there is a free flow of capital across countries. According to a recent report 
(Deloitte Center 2015), the tendency for corporations to merge has continuously accelerated. In 
2015, U.S. merger deals surpassed $1 trillion, and globally, the total value reached $4 trillion. 
Mergers and acquisitions account for about 60 percent of the total domestic investment and 
nearly 80 percent of all the foreign direct investment flows. 
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Similarly, the mergers and acquisitions have been of considerable interest to researchers. 
Researchers have primarily focused on determinants and motivations, partner selection and 
integration process, and short- and long-term firm performance (King et al. 2004). However, 
results are inconclusive regarding the consequences of mergers for firm value. Although growth 
and innovation (2010 MSI research priorities) are often listed as critical motivations for mergers 
(Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009), these phenomena are not familiar to many marketing scholars, 
and marketing is not the first functional area to enter managers’ minds when they think of 
mergers or acquisitions (Capron and Hulland 1999; Homburg and Bucerius 2005; Sorescu et al. 
2007; Swaminathan et al. 2008). One reason for this is that there is still a lack of the research 
related to the role of marketing assets in the merger process. The findings of existing marketing 
studies looking at marketing and mergers can be summarized into two broad categories: 1) how 
pre-merger marketing assets create value, and 2) how post-merger integration or resource 
deployment affects performance. However, these studies are based on the “acquirer” or “two 
firm” view, and do not discuss the effect of mergers on the other parties related to the merging 
firms. In reality, many of the “intangible assets”, such as marketing, are based on certain 
assumptions towards the other players in the network, such as competitors, channel partners, 
customers and investors of the two merging firms (Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009). In order to 
fully understand the role of marketing and the change in the overall landscape, a network-based 
approach is needed. Accordingly, I use a network-based approach to investigate the links 
between mergers, post-merger marketing, and firm value, while considering an acquirer’s 
competitors in the product market as well as investors in the financial market. 
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1.2 Dissertation Structure and Preview 
 In Essay 1, I explore a contingency framework in which the expectation of investors 
plays a moderating role in the links between marketing investments and firm value. Specifically, 
I design a test and then provide empirical evidence that enhances a discussion about how the 
degree of information asymmetry between an acquirer and investors affects a firm’s marketing 
investments and firm value. Generally, it is the investors who have less information about the 
firm than the firms do as the managers have special knowledge or resources that can significantly 
affect the firm’s value. This information asymmetry can create a “lemons problem” (Akerlof 
1970). Because buyers are likely to accept a price that reflects an average quality with lack of 
information, the low-quality lemons are more likely to enter the market than the high-quality 
companies. The potential for the lemons problem necessitates that firms create and implement 
corporate strategies that promote efficient delivery of information about firms’ true value. In the 
present globalized world, the situation is more complex as investment is the key component that 
contributes to the general management of a firm and there are increasing opportunities for 
investors. Marketing is one of the most effective signaling mechanisms for establishing better 
communication between a firm and the financial market. Accordingly, I estimate the degree and 
the effects information asymmetry has on returns to marketing investments in a merger, a setting 
where information asymmetry is likely to have a large effect on the relation between a firm and 
investors. 
I report two sets of analyses using data from several sources, including the Securities 
Data Corporation (SDC)’s Thompson Merger and Acquisition database, COMPUSTAT of 
Standard & Poor’s, and Chicago Booth’s Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) between 
1990 and 2010. In order to quantify the effect and intricacy among mergers, firms, and investors, 
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I employ a dynamic panel General Method of Moments (GMM) approach (Arellano and Bover 
1995; Blundell and Bond 1998), which allows for the modeling of the dynamic endogeneity. An 
initial examination of the data shows that, on average, mergers lead to acquirers’ significant 
disinvestment in their marketing in the years following a merger. However, I also find that stock 
returns are greater for acquirers that invest more than their competitors do following the merger. 
Additionally, I find that the effects of post-merger marketing investments are contingent on the 
degree of information asymmetry. The results show that the positive impact of marketing on firm 
value is stronger and slowly decreases when the degree of information is higher compared to 
when the degree of information is lower.  
 In Essay 2, I examine how a firm, faced with the businesses restructuring phase, can 
strategically manage a portfolio of investments. Specifically, I design a test and then provide 
empirical evidence that enhances the discussion of how changes in marketing investments and 
productivity through a merger affect firm value. In theory, the merger transactions represent a 
wide range of unique business optimization opportunities in the production capabilities, 
organizational structures, and financial indicators Hitt et al. (1990, 1991). Mergers create an 
increase in relative efficiency, which can later translate into more profit and a sustainable 
competitive advantage. That is to say, a merger is successful when the companies that enter into 
a merger achieve better economies of scale, better use of resources, and a more effective market 
presence. However, enhancing production and marketing operations of the merged firm is the 
process fraught with difficulty because, contrary to other investment projects, mergers typically 
require a large amount of financial and managerial resources. Thus, the slower improvements are 
expected to occur (Agrawal et al. 1992). In fact, acquirers oftentimes encounter a reduction in 
productivity immediately following a merger despite huge investments in it, because there are 
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more questions than answers (Hitt et al. 1990, 1991). To address this, I estimate the degree and 
effects changes in marketing productivity have on the link between marketing investments and 
firm value in a merger, while providing accounts of multi-faceted aspects of firm productivity.  
 I use a sample that consists of 153 public U.S. acquirers in chemical and rubber, 
electronic equipment, and automotive industry. These specific industries were chosen because 
they are characterized by intensive use of marketing assets as well as other functional assets. I 
utilize the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to measure marketing productivity (Banker et al. 
1984; Charnes et al. 1978). This method allows for the identification of a set of action priorities 
for marketing managers and quantification of the gains of implementing such strategies. An 
initial examination of the data shows that mergers lead to acquirers’ significant disinvestment in 
their marketing relative to a firm’s rivals post-merger. However, empirical results show that 
increases in marketing are associated with increases in sales post-merger. Furthermore, I find a 
negative association between the marketing productivity increase and firm value. This 
juxtaposition could lead to difficult decisions for the marketing manager. Superior marketing 
investment is more likely to lower the level of marketing productivity, but this low productivity 
tends to achieve higher stock prices. I provide the underlying theoretical rationale for the 
negative association between productivity and firm value as well as an understanding of the 
conditions under which aggressive marketing investments lead to a win-win outcome for 
acquirers. 
 In Essay 3, I investigate the two-way information flows between acquiring firm managers 
and investors in the stock market. Specifically, I design a test and then provide empirical 
evidence that enhances the discussion of whether and how stock return and stock volatility at the 
time of a merger drive post-merger marketing investment decisions. In Essay 1 and 2, I find the 
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evidence of the effects marketing investment and productivity have on the acquirer’s financial 
firm value. In Essay3, I find the evidence of the effects stock market has on the acquirer’s 
marketing and R&D investment post-merger. The underlying rationale is that the stock return 
and volatility are useful sources of information (Hayek 1945). Because one of the fundamental 
roles of the stock market is to produce and aggregate of information, firms extract information 
from the stock fluctuation and consider it when making corporate investment decisions. The 
hypothesis implies that the stock market possesses information that is new to firms although 
managers are generally better-informed than investors about the fundamental and prospects of a 
firm (Luo 2005; Chen et al. 2007). This information is more likely to be related to the weakness 
of the merger plan the acquirer has overlooked, such as the potential competition following a 
post-merger integration. To address this, I estimate the degree and effects the stock return and 
stock volatility at the time of a merger announcement have on the mangers’ investment patterns 
in marketing and R&D post-merger. 
In order to comprehend the post-merger investment decisions, I categorize acquirers into 
four groups based on the pattern of marketing and R&D investments. Firms are grouped 
depending on whether they spend more or less than the industry average of marketing and R&D 
investments. I find that both merger announcement return and its volatility predict an acquirer’s 
post-merger investment patterns. Acquirers extract information from the stock market reaction 
and consider it when making corporate investment decisions. By using a probit regression, I 
show that a negative reaction to a merger announcement leads to a superior investment in 
marketing of the acquirer relative to rivals and inferior investment in R&D post-merger. In 
addition, the results show that the relation varies with the volatility of merger announcement 
return, suggesting that firms have a stronger incentive to use information contained in the stock 
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fluctuation as the degree of information is higher. The results are consistent with the contingent 
role of information asymmetry found in the Essay 1 and 2.  
 Through these three studies, I provide an overview of the links between marketing 
investments, marketing productivity, and firm value. My theoretical and empirical analyses 
inform specific assessment and diagnosis techniques and implementable guidelines that 
marketing managers may use in practice, which I discuss further in subsequent chapters. 
Collectively, the findings from this dissertation contribute new knowledge to the field of 
marketing, are applicable to both researchers and practitioners, and identify promising directions 
for further research on mergers. 
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CHAPTER 2 – ESSAY 1: POST-MERGER RETURNS TO MARKETING 
INVESTMENTS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the current study is to design a test and then to provide empirical evidence 
that enhances a discussion as to when and how a firm’s marketing investments affect its 
performance in the financial market. Recent literature has sought the performance implication of 
the marketing assets (for a summary, see Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009). Furthermore, studies 
have emphasized that information is not a separate factor in determining and executing 
marketing strategy of a firm. The relationship between information and firm performance is 
central to any marketing strategy and, in particular, to the context addressed here. A key to this is 
a firm’s marketing actions, which serve as the fundamental path through which information is 
delivered to the markets. In the original seminal piece on the signaling aspect of marketing, 
Nelson (1970) argued that the mere fact that a firm is advertising more than competition suggests 
that it is of superior quality. Spence (1974) is the classic paper on the process of signaling in the 
economics literature. However, what previous studies leave less explored is the empirical 
measurement and test of information asymmetry that has a decisive effect on marketing 
investment and firm performance. To study this question, I estimate the degree and effects 
information asymmetry has on returns to marketing in a merger, a natural setting where 
information asymmetry is most likely to exhibit the greatest effect on marketing managers and 
investors. 
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Mergers and acquisitions continue to be popular vehicles for firm survival and growth 
(Barney 1991; Wernerfelt 1984). The resource-based view (RBV) considers mergers as strategic 
corporate investments taken in order to meet customer needs by integrating assets and 
capabilities that exist inside and outside the firm’s boundaries. The post-merger years are 
eminently unique; mergers often significantly change the outlook of a firm and its industry, 
which increases the degree of information asymmetry for both the acquirer and investors. 
Therefore, I contend that examining the effect of marketing and information asymmetry in the 
post-merger period is particularly important and relevant relative to other contexts (e.g., 
contractions or equity offerings). Unlike other contexts, a merger transaction requires a 
considerable amount of managerial and financial resources that otherwise could support 
marketing. As a result, acquirers may face a temporary competitive disadvantage in terms of 
marketing investment because mergers expose acquirers to a significantly greater debt-to-equity 
ratio. Often the popular and business press suggests post-merger integration is the focus of post-
merger activity and thereby recommends spending less on advertising. However, I argue that 
increasing marketing investment can enhance firm value by delivering critical information about 
an acquirer’s current and future operations. Moreover, I contend that the degree of information 
asymmetry is a moderating variable that determines the direction and efficacy of marketing 
adjustments. Accordingly, I design a test to answer following questions: 1) Should acquirers 
increase or decrease marketing investments throughout a merger to enhance firm value? 2) What 
factors should acquirers consider when determining their marketing investment? The findings 
provide useful insights for acquiring-firm managers to allocate resources in marketing. 
I report two sets of analyses using data from several sources, including the Securities 
Data Corporation (SDC)’s Thompson Merger and Acquisition database, COMPUSTAT of 
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Standard & Poor’s, and Chicago Booth’s Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) between 
1990 and 2010. An initial examination of the data shows that, on average, mergers lead to 
acquirers’ significant disinvestment in their marketing in the years following a merger, which 
seems to directly reflect the recommendations of the business press. However, I also find that, in 
fact, stock returns are greater for acquirers that invest more than their competitors do following 
the merger. The results suggest that, in this case, the greater marketing spend reveals managers’ 
private information about their firms’ business prospects and alleviates concerns stemming from 
the merger, thereby contributing positively to firm value. Besides the main effect, I find that the 
effects of post-merger marketing investments are contingent on the degree of information 
asymmetry. The results show that the positive impact of marketing on firm value is stronger and 
more slowly decreases when the degree of information is higher than when the degree of 
information is lower. In order to quantify the effect and intricacy among mergers, firms, and 
investors, I employ a dynamic panel General Method of Moments (GMM) approach (Arellano 
and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998), which allows for the modeling of the dynamic 
endogeneity. Further, I use a unique benchmark to make counterfactual comparisons.  
 I structure the rest of the paper as follows: I begin by presenting the related literature and 
theoretical background, from which I derive the hypotheses. Next, I describe the data sources 
and operationalization of measures, followed by the research method employed. Finally, I 
conclude by discussing the results, suggesting implications, and summarizing limitations. 
 
2.2 Related Literature and Contribution 
This study makes contributions to four related research streams, as Table 1 summarizes. 
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The Impact of Mergers on Firm Value  
The literature has long been intrigued with understanding the magnitude of abnormal 
returns to acquiring firms and the factors affecting those returns (Jensen and Ruback 1983; 
Agrawal et al. 1992; Fuller et al. 2002). Agrawal et al. (1992), using an exhaustive sample of 
mergers, find that stockholders of bidding firms suffer a significant loss over the five-year period. 
Andrade et al. (2001) summarize a large body of evidence spanning four decades and report that 
announcement return to bidders is generally zero or slightly negative. Loughran and Vijh (1997) 
find significantly positive excess returns over the period of 1970–1989 but only when firms 
complete cash-tender offers. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) report that the poor performance of low 
book-to-market “glamour” causes the long-term underperformance of acquiring. Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) argue for the influence of managerial hubris and overvaluation as explanations. 
Other factors investigated include merger type, relative size, strategic orientation, and both firms’ 
structures (Loughran and Vijh 1997; Fuller et al. 2002; Moeller et al. 2004; Haleblian et al. 
2012). This study contributes to this literature by identifying a marketing strategy that ultimately 
can improve an acquirer’s short- and long-term stock returns. 
 
The Impact of Mergers on Marketing Metrics  
Research addressing marketing metrics in mergers mainly finds the decreased activity in 
R&D and innovation activity in the post-merger period. Hitt et al. (1990, 1991) suggest that an 
acquirer’s lower commitment to innovation post-merger is anticipated, and as a result, 
acquisitions lead to lower R&D investments. Seru (2014) reports that diversifying mergers 
produce both a small number of patents and less-novel innovations compared to failed mergers. 
With respect to the factors that are associated with post-merger marketing efficacy, studies report 
that similarity of knowledge base has a non-linear impact on subsequent innovation performance. 
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Ahuja and Katila (2001) argue that the size of acquired knowledge enhances innovation output, 
while Prabhu et al. (2005) contend that high depth and breadth of knowledge base produce more 
innovations. Finally, Bena and Li (2014) show that firms with prior technological linkages 
between two merging entities produce more patents post-merger. This study contributes to this 
literature by examining a different marketing metric, advertising investments in a merger, and its 
subsequent impact on the acquirer’s firm value. 
 
Marketing Assets to Enhance Firm Value in a Merger 
In contrast to finance literature, considerable marketing research has investigated the 
effects of marketing assets on the merger performance. Early research using a survey 
methodology examined the post-merger integration of marketing assets such as brand, sales 
forces, and general marketing expertise, in horizontal acquisitions (Capron and Hulland 1999; 
Homburg and Bucerius 2005). Sorescu et al. (2007) argue that the high product capital, which is 
measured as a pre-merger sales force counts and R&D investments, allows acquirers to better 
select targets with greater potential and to better deploy this potential. Swaminathan et al. (2008) 
explore how pre-merger resource configurations between advertising and R&D facilitates value 
creation. Moreover, the stock market exhibits positive reactions to acquisitions of a brand with 
higher price/quality positioning or greater portfolio diversity (Bahadir et al. 2008; Wiles et al. 
2012). This study contributes to the literature by proposing and demonstrating a different 
perspective that marketing can determine an acquirer's long-term firm value by reducing 
information asymmetry between the firm and investors. I compare pre- and post-merger 
marketing investments, the degree of information asymmetry, and firm value, rather than 
focusing on either pre- or post-merger years. 
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Table 1 
Related Literature and the Incremental Contributions of the Study 
Key Issue and Main Finding Publications Incremental Contribution 
The Impact of Mergers on Firm Value 
Key issue: Whether and how mergers improve 
a firm’s long-term stock returns as well as 
announcement returns 
Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992) 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) 
Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) 
 
 
This study contributes to this literature 
by identifying a marketing strategy that 
ultimately can improve an acquirer’s 
short- and long-term stock returns by 
delivering information. 
Main finding: An acquirer, on average, suffers 
a significant loss post-merger. This finding is 
consistent across different industries and time 
periods. 
The Impact of Mergers on Marketing Metrics 
Key issue: Whether and how mergers affect a 
firm’s marketing metrics such as R&D 
(innovation) 
Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland (1990) 
Hitt, Hoskisson, Ireland, and Harrison (1991) 
Ahuja and Katila (2001) 
Prabhu, Chandy, and Ellis (2005) 
Seru (2014) 
Bena and Li (2014) 
 
 
 
This study examines a different 
marketing metric, advertising 
investments in a merger, and its 
subsequent impact on the acquirer’s 
firm value. 
Main finding: Acquisitions, on average, lead to 
lower investments in R&D. However, the 
negative impacts may be affected by several 
factors, including merger type, prior knowledge 
bases, and relatedness of a merger. 
Marketing Assets to Enhance Firm Value in a Merger 
Key issue: The effect of an acquirer's pre- and 
post-merger marketing assets on the merger 
performance 
Capron and Hulland (1999) 
Homburg and Bucerius (2005) 
Sorescu, Chandy, and Prabhu (2007) 
Bahadir, Bharadwaj, and Srivastava (2008) 
Swaminathan, Murshed, and Hulland (2008) 
Wiles, Morgan, and Rego (2012) 
 
 
 
This study proposes and demonstrates 
a different perspective that compares 
pre- and post-merger periods and can 
determine an acquirer's long-term firm 
value, rather than focusing on either 
pre- or post-merger. 
Main finding: Several pre-merger marketing 
assets (such as brands, sales forces, and R&D) 
and their post-merger integration can contribute 
positively or negatively to firm value. 
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Marketing as a Moderator in the Marketing-Finance Interface  
Key issue: Whether and how advertising may 
moderate firm performances in several external 
shocks 
Joshi and Hanssens (2009) 
Steenkamp and Fang (2011) 
Chen, Liu, and Zhang (2012) 
Kurt and Hulland (2013) 
Xiong and Bharadwaj (2014) 
Gao, Xie, Wang, and Wilbur (2015) 
 
 
This study contributes to this literature 
by showing the moderating role of 
marketing in a different event: mergers 
and acquisitions. This study propose 
that advertising can be used as a 
strategic variable to reduce information 
asymmetry in the post-merger period. 
Main finding: A firm’s advertising affects 
performances in specific events, including 
movie releases, third-party reviews, 
contractions, IPOs and SEOs, firm news, and 
product recalls. 
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Marketing as a Moderator in the Marketing-Finance Interface 
Recently, marketing research has paid increasing attention to the impacts of marketing 
strategies on performances (Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009). As a result, past studies have 
investigated the moderating role of advertising in several external shocks. The main thesis is that 
investors would look to firms’ advertising activities for a signal to reduce the degree of 
asymmetry of information (Spence 1974; Nelson 1974). However, findings on the signaling role 
of advertising are mixed, depending on a firm’s financial condition. Specifically, Steenkamp and 
Fang (2011) report that increasing advertising has significantly positive effects during 
contractions. In contrast, Kurt and Hulland (2013) argue that investors may view an increasing in 
advertising negatively when equity issuing firms have weaker financial flexibility than their 
industry peers. This study contributes to this literature by presenting evidence of the positive 
signaling role of advertising in a merger and acquisition. I propose that marketing can be used as 
a strategic variable to reduce the degree of information asymmetry between the firm and 
investors, despite the financial disadvantage in the post-merger period. 
 
2.3 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
 
Post-Merger Marketing Investments 
A merger causes higher levels of leverage for an acquirer. The strained financial 
resources lead to a situation in which firms must limit their investment or reduce the quality of 
their products. Research has shown highly leveraged firms to be reluctant to make major 
advertising investments due to the intangible and nontransferable nature of marketing assets 
(Table 2). Even if acquirers are willing to invest more in marketing, the merger simply would be 
a strategic opportunity for relatively affluent rivals on the other side of the market. For instance, 
Telser (1996) describes how deep-pocketed firms may drive their financially weak rivals out of 
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the market by adopting predatory strategies, such as advertising wars. By doing so, the 
competitors would seek not only to communicate the value of their own growth opportunities but 
also to strategically negate the effect of the acquirer’s marketing strategies in order to take 
advantage of similar opportunities that the acquirer would have cultivated. Acquirers, 
acknowledging the possibility of being confronted with the fierce reactions by their competitors, 
may not aggressively increase their marketing investments post-merger because the increased 
leverage would limit a firm’s ability to respond in a timely manner. Accordingly, I argue that the 
downward direction of marketing adjustments to be observed in a year following a merger 
announcement, when compared to the years preceding the merger announcement. Hence, I 
hypothesize the following: 
 
H1: On average, acquirers tend to decrease their marketing investments in a year following a 
merger announcement, compared to the years preceding the merger announcement.
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Table 2 
Research on the Effects of Limited Financial Resources on Marketing Strategy and Firm Performance 
Authors Study Context Findings 
Chevalier (1995)  Leveraged buyouts Highly leveraged supermarkets compete less 
aggressively  
Kovenock and Phillips (1995) Leveraged buyouts Highly leveraged firms are less likely to make 
major investments  
Zingales (1998)  Deregulations Highly leveraged trucking firms are less likely 
to survive in price wars  
Hanka (1998) All industries except financial and utilities 
firms  
More leveraged firms tend to hire more part-
time employees and pay lower wages  
Khanna and Tice (2000)  Walmart’s Entry Firms with greater leverage decrease 
investments in resisting Walmart’s entry  
Peyer and Shivdasani (2001)  All industries except financial firms  Leverage motives firms to focus on short-term 
cash flows, which decreases long-term firm 
value 
 
 
Grullon, Kanatas, and Kumar (2006) 
 
New funding raised 
 
More leveraged firms tend to invest less in 
advertising  
Gielens, Van De Gucht, Steenkamp, and 
Dekimpe (2008) 
Walmart’s Entry European retailers with higher leverage 
perform more poorly as a result of 
disinvestments  
Kurt and Hulland (2013)  IPO and SEO firms  Financial flexibility moderates the positive 
impact of marketing on firm value  
Phillips and Sertsios (2013) Airlines firms Leveraged firms increase prices and decrease 
product quality for short-term revenues  
Malshe and Agarwal (2015)  All industries except financial firms  Leverage reduces customer satisfaction and 
negatively moderates its positive impacts on 
firm value 
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Positive Signaling Effects of Marketing Investments 
Recent research explores the signaling role of marketing investment contributes in 
various economic shock contexts, including movie releases, contractions, and product recalls 
(Table 1). However, results are indecisive. For example, Luo (2008) investigates the relation 
between marketing spending and initial public offering (IPO) performance. The results uncover 
that the benefits of pre-IPO marketing spending are positive and not trivial. An issuer’s 
marketing helps reduce underpricing and boost trading volume in the stock market. On the other 
hand, Mizik and Jacobson (2007) suggest that cutting marketing investment leads to a higher 
stock price in the short-term in the context of equity offering. However, the authors argue that 
the stocks are temporarily overestimated in that the misevaluation corrects adequately in the long 
run, suggesting the myopic behavior such as cutting marketing does not have a significant impact 
in the long term.  
While these studies document the effectiveness of marketing in coping with firm-level 
economic changes, relatively little is known about the opposite: how firms’ marketing 
investment adjusts to deal with the microeconomic changes and, as a result, how firm 
performance improves correspondingly. One notable exception is Kurt and Hulland (2013), who 
find that adopting an aggressive investment is the preponderant marketing strategy of equity-
issuing firms. The authors argue that increased marketing can enable managers to communicate 
to investors about their firms’ future prospects and therefore and aggressive marketing 
immediately enhances shareholder value. Of particular importance for this study is an intuition 
behind their marketing measure. The authors account for economy- and industry-wide factors in 
their analysis by estimating industry-year specific betas. This determines whether an equity-
issuing firm invests on marketing beyond the industry forecasts. Similarly, Steenkamp and Fang 
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(2011) highlight the use of marketing investment measures relative to firms’ competitors. They 
argue that theorizing based on the relative metrics is important not only because it reflects 
competition firms are facing but also because it is useful in investigating how firms react to 
changing economic conditions. Hence, I hypothesize the following: 
 
H2: Investing more in marketing relative to its rivals in a year following a merger announcement 
is positively associated with an acquirer’s firm value. 
 
The Degree of Information Asymmetry and Marketing investments 
A merger creates uncertainty and intensifies the information asymmetry between 
acquirers and investors, which may ultimately lead to lower firm value (Bartov and Bodnar 
1996). Information asymmetry raises transaction costs and reduces expected liquidity in the 
stock market. I argue that marketing can alleviate these consequences by reducing the degree of 
information asymmetry between the firm and investor. In most cases, acquirers have private 
information not only about the quality of firms’ products but also about the true financial value 
of firms’ post-merger growth opportunities (Chemmanur and Yan 2009). In general, information 
asymmetry can be reduced by three mechanisms: 1) carrying legally binding forces such as 
contractions, 2) monitoring by outside agents, and 3) signaling (Nelson 1974; Spence 1974). 
Between firms and financial market agents, marketing, among various instruments, is a credible 
signal because investors interpret the increased investments as a manager’s effort to reduce 
information asymmetry (Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009). Such a proactive adjustment in 
marketing is only economically optimal when returns to post-merger investments are expected to 
be positive. If the benefit of marketing is low a firm would not be able to recover the incurred 
costs. Hence, the decision of whether or not to increase marketing is strongly influenced by the 
    
 
21 
sign and the magnitude of the expected strategic profit, which are likely to be positive and 
greater when the degree of information asymmetry is higher.  
The premise of the prediction is that, in the post-merger period, acquirers have incentives 
to reduce the degree of information asymmetry in order to maximize firm value. In fact, when 
increasing marketing investments, the managerial desire for a reduction of information 
asymmetry and thereby a maximization of firm value should outweigh other factors, including a 
firm’s limited financial resources and market position post-merger. Hence, I argue that the 
degree of information asymmetry is an important conditioning variable to consider when 
examining the positive impacts of marketing investment on firm value. The higher the degree of 
information asymmetry, the more positive impacts of marketing investments is expected. High 
information asymmetry increases uncertainty in return on investment and therefore enhances 
potential incentives of both managers and investors to reduce the level of information asymmetry. 
To the extent that firms are able to convey information about their true value and future cash 
flow, the reduced information asymmetry manifests in stock prices. The positive reaction in the 
financial market to managers’ effort on reducing the uncertainty is more likely to be apparent in 
the samples of acquirers with greater information asymmetry. Hence, I hypothesize the following: 
 
H3: The positive impact of an acquirer’s marketing investments in a year following a merger on 
firm value is moderated by the degree of information asymmetry. 
 
2.4 Data and Measures 
 
Sample 
I collect the full sample from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Thompson Merger 
and Acquisition database between 1990 and 2010. In addition, I use the COMPUSTAT of 
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Standard & Poor’s to collect firms’ annual financial/accounting information, including marketing 
investment, sales revenue, and several control variables. I use the Chicago Booth’s Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to collect stock market–related data to estimate short- and 
long-term stock return. The data treatment and merging procedure closely parallel those in the 
prior literature (Sorescu et al. 2007; Swaminathan et al. 2008).1 This merging process using the 
SDC, COMPUSTAT, and CRSP database leads to a pooled cross-sectional time series panel 
with a total of 2,855 observations.  
I also construct control samples to compare the effects and causal relation between 
marketing investments, information asymmetry, and firm performance. I use two different 
groups of firms as controls for the empirical analysis. The first group comprises the firms that 
have no plan to merge, and the second group comprises the firms that had plans to merge but did 
not complete the merger.2 First, I match each M&A firm with a firm that is not involved in a 
merger on the basis of sales, total asset, and industry. The matched firms are carefully selected 
with in the same two-digit SIC industry codes when the firm has the closest sales and total asset 
to the M&A firm’s sales and total asset in year of a merger. The matched sample comprises 
2,855 observations. The second control sample is the withdrawn mergers to address the 
counterfactual scenario of how an acquirer would have invested in marketing and performed in 
                                                 
1 Prior literature (Croci and Petmezas 2009) finds that, for companies that engage in a series of acquisitions, merger 
announcement returns are not independent. Therefore, following Prabhu et al. (2005), I retain only the biggest 
transaction in terms of deal value to eliminate the confounding effects of sequential mergers. The final sample 
consists of mergers across all industries to preserve reliable and generalizable results. However, I test whether the 
effect is unique in the financial sector (SIC6000-6999). The result is not sensitive to the inclusion of the financial 
sector. 
 
2 Matching based on the observable variable is one of the popular strategies that can be used in this situation. The 
use of an unsuccessful mergers sample can be considered as more sophisticated and hypothetical matching sample 
approach. I report the results using a dynamic panel GMM model to account for heterogeneity and endogeneity for 
all samples. As a robustness check, I perform a difference-in-difference approach as well. The main results are 
replicable in a set of difference-in-difference analyses with two distinctive control samples.  
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the absence of a merger.3 The use of the withdrawn sample as a control strengthens the 
investigation, as the merger decision is made endogenously and strategically. As a result, the 
acquirer is likely to substantially differ from an average or randomly chosen matched firm, both 
at the time of a merger and in future periods. To keep every aspect of the compiling of the 
completed and withdrawn samples consistent, I use similar steps to compile the latter, except that 
I only retain observations with the deal status of “Withdrawn” in the SDC database. Next, I 
screen out any merger attempts that are withdrawn due to reasons directly related to marketing 
strategy of two merging firms.4 I categorize several cancellation reasons mainly based on the 
deal synopses in the SDC M&A database and manual search in LexisNexis and Factiva to 
supplement. The withdrawn sample comprises 589 mergers. I present, in Table 3, the descriptive 
statistics of selected variables for the completed, matched, and withdrawn samples. 
 
Measures 
I focus on both short- and long-term financial market performance. First, I estimate 
annual stock return by compounding the monthly stock returns for a given fiscal year. Short-term 
performance uses 12 consecutive monthly stock returns starting from the January after a merger 
is announced. Long-term performance uses 24 (2-year) consecutive monthly stock returns. To 
control for the value risk (Fama and French 1993), I use the risk-adjusted abnormal stock return.5  
 
                                                 
3 Not all pursued acquisitions are ultimately completed due to several reasons such as regulatory intervention, 
competing offer, or disagreement between management and board. Similar empirical design has been used in a 
different context in finance literature to avoid the potential endogeneity problem (Savor and Lu 2009, Seru 2014). 
 
4 This allows for the use of the withdrawn sample as a strong control. In order to keep out various endogenous 
reasons for the merger withdrawal, I also test an even smaller sample of merger attempts that are withdrawn due to 
regulatory objections only (i.e., anti-trust issues). The results remain unchanged. 
 
5 However, the overall findings remain unchanged by the use of size-adjusted or equally weighted market portfolio 
(Mizik and Jacobson 2007; Mizik 2010). 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics of Financial Variables for the Completed Sample and Two Control 
Samples 
  
Completed  
Sample 
Matched 
Sample 
Withdrawn  
Sample 
Total 
Assets 
Mean 10,591 10,692 10,237 
Median    801     874     653 
Std. 78,498 78,264 88,003 
Book-to-
Market 
Value 
Mean 0.46 0.48   0.49 
Median 0.38 0.35   0.37 
Std. 0.58 0.63   0.83 
Marketing 
Intensity 
Mean 0.01 0.01   0.01 
Median 0.00 0.00   0.00 
Std. 0.03 0.03   0.03 
Liquidity 
Mean 0.25 0.23   0.24 
Median 0.22 0.21   0.23 
Std. 0.21 0.21   0.22 
Sales 
Growth 
Mean 1.35 1.23   1.68 
Median 1.16 1.56   1.08 
Std. 3.58 4.76 10.66 
Note: Total Assets is reported in dollars. Book-to-Market Value is the ratio between book value of common stock at 
the year of a merger and the stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding at the year of a merger. 
Marketing Intensity is advertising expenditure divided by total asset at the year of a merger. Liquidity is calculated 
by dividing the sum of debt in current liabilities and long-term debt by total asset at the year of a merger. Sales 
Growth is sales at the year of a merger scaled by lagged sales. 
 
I construct marketing investment as a firm’s advertising expenditure scaled by the total 
assets in the same year for several reasons. First, given the interest in marketing as a source of 
signals, advertising expenditure will be more appropriate and precise because advertising 
investment is highly correlated with overall marketing budget. Several studies in related 
literature use a share of SG&A expenditure (Mizik and Jacobson 2003; Swaminathan et al. 2008; 
Kurt and Hulland 2013). However, this item generally includes various forms of other expenses 
that are unrelated to marketing activity. Second, the primary interest lies in determining the 
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effect of marketing that is not associated with integration tasks. The advertising expenditure item 
excludes any financial value of marketing resource used for the post-merger integration.6  
 
Table 4 
Measurements of Information Asymmetry 
Authors Measures of Information Asymmetry Study Context 
Dierkens (1991) Standard deviation of the market-adjusted, 
three-day abnormal return at the 
announcement, the residual volatility of the 
equity of the firm, the number of public 
announcements published, volume of trading 
 
Equity issues 
 
Bartov and Bodnar 
(1996) 
 
Bid-ask spread, volume of trade General 
Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999) 
Forecast error, standard deviation of forecasts, 
normalized forecast error, volatility in 
abnormal returns around earnings 
announcements, residual volatility in daily 
stock returns 
 
Spin-offs 
 
Frankel and Li (2004) Profitability, intensity of insider trades General 
 
Chae (2005)  
 
Company size, number of analysts, bid-ask 
spread, industry dummies 
 
Scheduled and unscheduled 
information-revealing 
announcement 
 
 
Moeller, Schlingemann, 
and Stulz (2007) 
Standard deviation of the earnings 
announcement, abnormal return, the firm’s 
idiosyncratic volatility  
 
Acquisitions 
 
Duartea, Han, Harforda, 
and Young (2008) 
PIN, institutional ownership percentages, 
whether firms is covered by analysts, number 
of news reports 
Regulation fair disclosure 
 
 
Officer, Poulsen, and 
Stegemoller (2009) 
 
R&D intensity, idiosyncratic return volatility 
 
 
Acquisitions 
 
Armstrong, Core, Taylor, 
and Verrecchia (2011) 
 
Bid-ask spread, R&D, scaled accruals quality, 
analyst coverage 
 
General 
 
                                                 
6 Reporting marketing investment in financial statement is not compulsory. Thus, firms may use their discretion in 
the disclosure of information. To account for the possibility of this motive, advertising data from TNS is used in a 
separate analysis. The overall findings remain unchanged. 
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I follow the finance literature (Dierkens 1991) and use two different proxies to measure 
the information asymmetry (IA). The first measure focuses on the behavior of the financial 
market at the merger announcement. This IA_anno variable is measured as the standard deviation 
of the market-adjusted, three-day (-1, +1) abnormal returns around the merger announcement. 
The CRSP value-weighted index is used as a proxy for the market portfolio. A volatile reaction 
in the financial market at the merger announcement suggests that the degree of information 
asymmetry is higher for the merger. The second measure focuses on the firm’s private 
information that is not yet shared with the financial market. This IA_resi variable is measures as 
the standard deviation of the market-adjusted daily stock price abnormal return in the year. This 
residual volatility captures the degree of information between the firm and investors that remains 
after removing the uncertainty that is common to the managers and financial market. A higher 
dispersion in the residual suggests that the degree of information asymmetry is higher for the 
merger.7 
 
2.5 Empirical Analysis and Results 
 
Mergers and Information Asymmetry 
In this study, the merger and acquisition is implicitly assumed to increase the degree of 
information asymmetry at the time of a merger announcement and in future periods. In the 
following, I test this in two ways. First, I compare the levels of information asymmetry of the 
completed sample with those of both control samples at the merger announcement. If the 
announcements of a merger are subject to greater information asymmetry issues, one should 
                                                 
7 To obtain the comparable announcement returns and measure of information asymmetry for the matched sample, I 
use the volatility in abnormal returns around earnings announcements, following the finance literature (Dierkens 
1991). The results reported here are based on the average reaction in the financial market for four quarterly earnings 
announcements in a given year. To ensure the robustness of using this “event”, I run five different models using four 
announcement reactions from four quarterly earnings announcements in a given year separately, and using their 
average. Primary results remain unchanged.  
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observe higher levels of information asymmetry for the completed sample relative to the 
matched sample but not relative to the withdrawn sample. The top panel of Table 5 summarizes 
the differences in the levels of information asymmetry between the samples at the merger 
announcement. The average IA_anno for the completed sample is 0.2581, which is significantly 
greater than that of the matched sample (0.0444), but is not statistically different from that of the 
withdrawn sample (0.1639) at the 1 percent level. The difference between the withdrawn sample 
and matched sample (0.1195) is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The results are 
consistent with the proposition that mergers increase the degree of information asymmetry. 
Second, I study the degree of information asymmetry for 5 years around the merger year for all 
three samples. I expect that the degree of information asymmetry peaks in merger year for both 
the completed and withdrawn samples but not in matched control sample. The bottom panel of 
Tale 5 summarizes the differences in the levels of information asymmetry between samples for 5 
years. The average IA_resi for both completed and withdrawn samples peaks in the merger year 
compared to the non-merger years, while the peak is not observed for the matched sample. The 
mean difference for the completed sample between year t (0.0736) and year t-1 (0.0238), and the 
mean difference for the withdrawn sample between year t (0.0678) and year t+1 (0.0467) are 
both significant at the 1 percent level. Note that there is a “sticky” pattern of uncertainty 
reduction for the withdrawn sample, which suggest that the withdrawal of merger reveals 
negative information and maintains a certain degree of information asymmetry post-merger. In 
the merger year, the mean difference between the completed and withdrawn samples (0.0058) is 
insignificant. However, the mean difference between the completed and withdrawn samples in 
year t+1 (-0.0234) and t+2 (-0.0091) is significant. Overall, the results presented in Table 5 
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support the notion that mergers increase the degree of information asymmetry in the stock 
market. 
 
Table 5  
Descriptive Statistics of the Changes in Information Asymmetry in a Merger 
  
 (1) 
Completed  
Sample 
(2) 
Matched 
Sample 
(3) 
Withdrawn  
Sample 
  
Difference 
(1)-(2) 
Difference 
(1)-(3) 
IA_anno (-1, +1) 
Mean 0.2581 0.0444 0.1639  0.2137***  0.0942 
Median 0.2561 0.0373 0.1492   0.2188***  0.1069 
IA_resi 
Mean 
year t-2 0.0227 0.0256 0.0221   -0.0029  0.0006 
year t-1 0.0238 0.0244 0.0239  -0.0006 -0.0001 
Year t 0.0736 0.0234 0.0678  0.0502***  0.0058 
year t+1 0.0233 0.0237 0.0467  -0.0004    -0.0234** 
year t+2 0.0228 0.0248 0.0319   -0.0020    -0.0091* 
Median 
year t-2 0.0195 0.0165 0.0164  0.0030 0.0031 
year t-1 0.0183 0.0171 0.0168  0.0012 0.0015 
Year t 0.0294 0.0168 0.0271  0.0126*** 0.0023 
year t+1 0.0186 0.0162 0.0251  0.0024    -0.0065** 
year t+2 0.0189 0.0161 0.0236   0.0028    -0.0047** 
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 
Note: The IA_anno (-1, +1) is the standard deviation of the market-adjusted, three-day (-1, +1) abnormal returns 
around the merger announcement. The IA_resi is the standard deviation of the market-adjusted daily stock price 
abnormal return in the corresponding year given that a merger occurs at year t. Tests on means and medians are 
based on t-tests and Wilcoxon tests, respectively.  
 
Mergers and Marketing Investments 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that an acquirer increases its marketing investments pre-merger and 
then decreases its marketing investments post-merger. To test, I run the following regression: 
Marketing Investment𝑖𝑡+1 −  Marketing Investment𝑖𝑡+𝑘 =  𝛽0 +  
                          𝛽1(𝑀&𝐴𝑖𝑡+1 − 𝑀&𝐴𝑖𝑡+𝑘) +  𝛽2(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑡+1 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡+𝑘) 
+ 𝜀𝑖                                                                                  (1) 
where i stands for firm, t for time (year) and k = -2, -1, 0. Marketing Investment a firm’s 
advertising expenditure scaled by its total asset. M&A is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
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merger is announced in the previous year and 0 otherwise. Control is a vector of control 
variables that could affect an acquirer’s marketing investment: financial flexibility, size, book-to-
market ratio, market share, and cashpmt. All control variables are defined as illustrated in Data 
and Measures section. I also control for a firm’s lagged marketing investment, year, and industry. 
Finally, I control for cross-sectional heterogeneity across firms by running a random effect 
regression. In equation (1), 𝛽1 is the primary interest because it gauges the difference in 
marketing investments between a year following a merger announcement (year t+1) and the pre-
merger years (year t-2, year t-1, and year t). A firm’s marketing investment changes in year t+1 
could occur due both to the firm’s anticipation of merging and to the firm’s product market 
considerations. In equation (1), after controlling for the effects of several product market factors 
(Control vector), 𝛽1 captures the portion of changes in marketing investments that is attributable 
to a merger decision. This model more accurately calculates the average adjustments level in 
marketing investment that is associated with the managers’ post-merger decision than 
autoregressive model (Chemmanur and Yan 2009). I expect 𝛽1 to be significantly negative for 
the completed sample to be consistent with H1. 
Table 6 presents the results from equation (1) with Year t-2, t-1, or t as pre-merger years 
for all three sample groups. First, the coefficient of M&A, 𝛽1, is significantly negative for the 
completed sample, suggesting that a successful acquirer’s reduce their marketing investments in 
a year following a merger announcement relative to pre-merger years. On average, an acquirer 
decreases its marketing investment by 1.4 percent relative to its total asset from year t-2 to year 
t+1, by 1.1 percent from year t-1, and by 0.12 percent from year t. 
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Table 6 
Marketing Investment Changes between the Merger Year and Non-Merger Year 
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 
Note: This table summarizes the results from the random effect regression on Marketing Investment in the merger year and non-merger year. The Marketing 
Investment a firm’s advertising expenditure scaled by its total asset. The independent variables consist of M&A, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the merger is 
announced in the previous year and 0 otherwise; Financial Flexibility, a ratio of the sum of debt in current liabilities, long-term debt, and cash to total assets; Size, 
the relative size of the firms measured by the relative equity; Book-to-Market Ratio, a ratio of the natural log of book value of common stock to the natural log of 
the product of number of shares outstanding and end-of-year- stock price; Market Share, a firm’s sales relative to industry sales in the past year. Industries are 
identified using two-digit SIC codes.
  Completed Sample   Matched Sample   Withdrawn Sample 
 
(Year t+1) - 
(Year t-2) 
(Year t+1) - 
(Year t-1) 
(Year t+1) 
- (Year t) 
  Δ(t-2) Δ (t-1) Δ (t)   Δ(t-2) Δ (t-1) Δ (t) 
M&A 
 
 
-0.014 
*** 
-0.011 
*** 
-0.012 
**  
0.010 
** 
0.007 
** 
0.011 
**  
0.013 
*** 
0.009 
** 
0.000 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Financial  
Flexibility 
 
0.009 
*** 
0.011 
** 
0.041 
***  
0.010 
** 
0.016 
*** 
0.009 
**  
0.011 
** 
0.027 
** 
0.005 
** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.012) (0.002) 
Size 
 
 
0.032 
** 
0.019 
*** 
0.006 
**  
0.003 
** 
0.001 
** 
0.000 
**  
0.010 
** 
0.007 
** 
0.011 
** 
(0.015) (0.006) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Book-to-Market  
Ratio 
 
0.006 
* 
.008 
 
0.002 
  
0.003 
* 
0.002 
 
0.002 
  
0.007 
* 
0.006 
 
0.005 
 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Market  
Share 
 
-0.147 
 
-0.111 
 
0.123 
 
 
 
0.008 
 
-0.021 
 
0.036 
*  
-0.046 
 
-0.147 
 
0.161 
 
(0.100) (0.893) (0.076)  (0.006) (0.035) (0.020)  (0.029) (0.132) (0.098) 
Lagged  
Marketing 
Investment  
 
0.619 
*** 
0.712 
*** 
0.825 
***  
0.783 
*** 
0.801 
*** 
0.86 
***  
0.61 
*** 
0.897 
*** 
0.611 
*** 
(0.029) (0.036) (0.039)   (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)   (0.033) (0.036) (0.023) 
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 Table 6 also exhibits the results for the matched and the withdrawn samples. The 𝛽1  for 
the matched sample is significantly positive over the years, suggesting that an acquirer’s rivals 
increase their marketing investment in year t+1 as expected. Competitors seek to take advantage 
of an acquirer’s temporary financial inflexibility by aggressively investing in marketing. The 𝛽1 
for the withdrawn sample is significantly positive prior to a merger but is insignificant following 
a merger, suggesting that the failed acquirers increase their marketing investments in the merger 
year but not in the following year. Overall, the results show that a successful acquirer 
aggressively invests in marketing pre-merger and then reduces its marketing post-merger, 
supporting H1. 
 
Information Asymmetry, Marketing Investments, and Firm Value 
Table 7 presents the results of a univariate analysis that directly investigates whether the 
short-term abnormal returns (in year t+1) differ across post-merger marketing investment. The 
results demonstrate the effect of two post-merger marketing investment strategies, spending 
more or less than industry average, under different degrees of information asymmetry. Two 
measures of information asymmetry, IA_anno and IA_resi, are used. An acquirer is classified to 
have a “high” (“low”) degree of information asymmetry when a firm falls into the top (bottom) 
quartile of portfolios sorted on each information asymmetry proxies.  
The results reveal significant differences of effects of marketing investment on abnormal 
returns. When the degree of information asymmetry is high, the short-term abnormal returns are 
significantly higher for firms investing more in marketing than industry average (0.0114 vs. -
0.0089 and 0.0103 vs. -0.0127), which is consistent with H2 and H3. More importantly, spending 
less than rivals in marketing post-merger may lead to a significant loss of financial firm value (-
0.0089 and -0.0127). Even if the information asymmetry induced by the merger announcement is 
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low, proactive marketing investments results in significantly positive stock prices (0.0078). The 
results also show that some acquirers can benefit from investing less in marketing (0.0081), 
which explains why acquirers tend to reduce their marketing post-merger, as presented in Table 
6. However, Table 7 offers preliminary evidence that not all acquires can gain from passive 
marketing activities. The results suggest that when ignoring a critical moderating factor such as 
the degree of information asymmetry, managers might mistakenly conclude that investing less in 
their marketing relative to rivals does not affect stock prices following a merger.  
 
Table 7  
Abnormal Returns under Different Post-Merger Marketing and Information Asymmetry 
 
Degree of Information Asymmetry  
Around Merger Announcement 
(IA_anno)  
Degree of Information Asymmetry  
in Merger Announcement Year 
(IA_resi𝑡) 
  High Low   High Low 
Investing 
MORE 
than rivals 
0.0114*** 0.0078** 
 
0.0103** 0.0065  
 
Investing 
LESS  
than rivals 
-0.0089** -0.0043 
 
-0.0127*** 0.0081*  
  
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 
Note: The short-term abnormal return reported here is cumulative abnormal return calculated by using 12 monthly 
stock returns in year t+1, starting from the January after a merger is announced. A firm is classified on the basis of 
whether its marketing investment in year t+1 is greater than industry average or not. Industries are identified using 
two-digit SIC codes. The IA_anno is the standard deviation of the market-adjusted, three-day (-1, +1) abnormal 
returns around the merger announcement. The 𝐼𝐴_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡  is the standard deviation of the market-adjusted daily stock 
price abnormal return in the merger year. A firm is classified to have a “high” (“low”) degree of information 
asymmetry when a firm falls into the top (bottom) quartile of portfolios sorted on the basis of IA_anno and 𝐼𝐴_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 .  
 
 Dynamic Panel General Method of Moments (GMM)  
To further examine the impact of post-merger marketing investments and information 
asymmetry, I specify a cross-sectional model as: 
Performanceit+k = β0 + β1Relative Marketingit+1 + β2 Information Asymmetryit 
                  + β3 Relative Marketingit+1 * Information Asymmetryit 
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                                        + β4 Performanceit+k-1 + β5 Controlit+1 + ηi + εit+1                   (2) 
where i stands for firm, t for time (year), and k=1, 2. The dependent variable, Performance, is 
either short- or long-term stock performance. Short-term performance (k=1) uses 12 consecutive 
monthly stock returns starting from the January after a merger is announced. Long-term 
performance (k=2) uses 24 consecutive monthly stock returns. To incorporate the competitive 
factors in marketing investments within a firm’s industry, the industry-level average of 
marketing intensity is calculated using the ratio of each firm’s marketing investment to its total 
asset. Relative Marketing is a difference between the marketing intensity of a focal firm and 
industry average. Industries are identified using two-digit SIC codes. Information Asymmetry is 
either IA_anno, the standard deviation of the market-adjusted, three-day (-1, +1) abnormal 
returns around the merger announcement, or IA_resi, the standard deviation of the market-
adjusted daily stock price abnormal return in the merger announcement year. Control is a vector 
of control variables including financial flexibility, size, book-to-market ratio, market share, 
cashpmt, and merger type. The ηi is a time-invariant unobservable firm fixed effect and εit+1 is a 
random error representing all unobservable components on the dependent variable.  
As discussed earlier, both heterogeneity and endogeneity display empirical challenges in 
studying mergers, marketing investment, and firm performance simultaneously. Previous studies 
tend to follow Heckman’s two-step method. However, marketing investment may also be 
endogenously determined here (Kurt and Hulland 2013). For instance, current marketing 
capability influences merger success in addition to the merger decision itself. This, in turn, 
impacts a firm’s future marketing investment and performance. The Heckman model may lead to 
a biased estimation in this instance, as it considers marketing investment as exogenous. Hence, I 
use the dynamic panel GMM model to control for such a dynamic endogeneity, simultaneity, and 
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heterogeneity. Past research has shown that dynamic panel GMM is preferable over fixed effects 
or Heckman’s model to handle the empirical challenge (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and 
Bond 1998; Dutt and Padmanabhan 2011; Rego et al. 2013; Kumar et al. 2014).8  
Here, the dynamic panel GMM estimation consists of four steps. First, I begin with a 
“levels-levels” model specification that includes firm performance as a dependent variable and 
both marketing investments and one-year lagged performance as independent variables (eq. 2). 
Second, the estimation proceeds by first differencing all variables in the equation, eliminating 
firm and year fixed effects as well as potential omitted variables bias. Third, I use the first two 
lagged values of variables as instruments. Still, endogeneity remains unsolved because Δ 
Marketing Investmentit+1 can be influenced by Δ Performanceit. Finally, I use the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) method where the predicted value of marketing investment can be obtained using 
the instrument variables, past performances. I employ a difference GMM estimator using the 
predicted value of marketing investment as an independent variable in the aforementioned model.  
The inherent weakness of dynamic panel GMM model arises due to the use of internal 
instrumental variables, which raises a potential problem of determining the optimal length of lags. 
Specifically, increasing the number of lags to be more exogenous may lead to the instruments of 
weaker validity. Following previous studies (Dutt and Padmanabhan 2011; Rego et al. 2013; 
Kumar et al. 2014), I include lags of one and two years. This allows for a sufficient horizon for 
past information to affect current performance expectations (Wintoki et al. 2012; Hoechle et al. 
2012). In addition, I report the Hansen J and C statistics for the validity of instruments provided 
                                                 
8 If it is believed that there is a dynamic relationship between present values of the independent variable and past 
values of the dependent variables, the fixed-effects model is more likely to be biased (Arellano and Bover 1995; 
Blundell and Bond 1998). In the presence of a lagged dependent variable as the independent variable, the fixed 
effect estimator is consistent only when T is large: the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term, 
but this correlation goes to zero as T gets large. With T greater than 30, this correlation should vanish, and the fixed 
effect estimator is likely to be consistent. I employ the GMM procedure in this study, as T is less than 30. 
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by two tests, the Hansen test of over identification and a difference-in-differences Hansen test of 
exogeneity, with AR(1) and AR(2) test statistics.  
The dynamic panel GMM model estimation results for all three samples are presented in 
Table 8. In addition to the estimation results for the central parameters of interest, the test 
statistics of model fit, serial correlation, and instrument variable validity are reported. All the 
serial correlation and instrument validity tests support the use of dynamic panel GMM model 
proposed. Pertaining to the hypothesized main effects for the completed sample, results using 
IA_resi𝑡 show that marketing has significantly positive impacts on the following years’ stock 
returns (year+1: 3.533, year+2: 2.215), supporting H2. The coefficients indicate that the positive 
signaling effect of aggressive marketing investments relative to industry rivals dominates. While 
marketing has a positive effect for the matched sample (year+1: 2.137), the positive effects are 
stronger and longer (p < 0.05) for the acquirers. It may be that when a firm experiences a merger, 
marketing becomes more powerful as a signal and therefore a necessity of marketing investments 
increases. With respect to the contingent effects of information asymmetry, the interaction 
between marketing and information asymmetry has a positive effect on stock return (year+1: 
1.548, year+2: 1.214). The positive relationship between post-merger marketing and information 
asymmetry is stronger and longer (p < 0.01) for a successful-acquirer sample than for matched-
firm (year+1: 1.116) and withdrawn-acquirer samples (year+1: 1.971). Considering the positive 
main effect of marketing on performance, the positive significant interaction suggests that when 
the degree of information asymmetry is higher, marketing has an even larger effect on 
performance. These results also hold when IA_anno is substituted into the same equation. To 
ensure the significance of the moderating factor, I also estimate the GMM model without 
considering information asymmetry factors and its interaction with marketing investment. Model 
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fit improves when incorporating the information asymmetry factors. The presence of direct and 
indirect effects of information asymmetry leads to identification of conditions under which 
marketing investment post-merger can positively contribute to stock return. These results 
demonstrate that elevated information asymmetry strengthens the positive effect of an acquirer’s 
post-merger marketing on firm value. Overall, the results supports H3, which predicts that 
information asymmetry moderates the link between marketing and performance, and implies that 
marketing is an effective tool to enhance firm value by delivering information to the financial 
market under high uncertainty. 
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Table 8 
Dynamic Panel GMM Estimation Results: All Samples 
DV: Stock 
Performance 
Information Asymmetry: IA_anno (-1, +1)   Information Asymmetry: IA_resi𝑡 
Completed 
Sample  
Matched 
Sample  
Withdrawn 
Sample  
Completed 
Sample  
Matched 
Sample   
Withdrawn 
Sample 
Year 
+1 
Year 
+2   
 Year 
+1 
Year 
+2   
Year 
+1 
Year 
+2   
Year 
+1 
Year 
+2   
Year 
+1 
Year 
+2   
Year 
+1 
Year 
+2 
Marketing 
 
 
2.397 1.587  1.845 0.815  2.862 1.682  3.533 2.215  2.137 1.170  2.145 1.514 
*** **  **   **   *** *  ***   **  
(0.90) (0.79)  (0.92) (0.94)  (1.21) (1.06)  (1.13) (1.05)  (0.82) (0.96)  (1.08) (0.95) 
Information 
Asymmetry 
 
-1.681 -0.871  -1.351 -0.927  -1.837 -1.371  -4.351 -2.179  -1.061 -1.073  -2.296 -1.374 
***   **   **   *** *     ***  
(0.64) (0.68)  (0.65) (0.63)  (0.84) (0.88)  (1.08) (1.39)  (0.65) (0.68)  (0.87) (0.93) 
Marketing 
*Information 
Asymmetry 
1.216 1.037  1.483 1.143  1.638 1.337  1.548 1.214  1.116 0.732  1.971 1.236 
** *  ***   **   *** **  **   ***  
(0.60) (0.58)  (0.54) (0.62)  (0.70) (0.71)  (0.50) (0.57)  (0.55) (0.51)  (0.73) (0.79) 
Lagged 
Stock 
Performance 
0.915 0.852  1.412 1.041  0.562 0.268  0.914 0.643  1.371 0.847  0.316 0.115 
*** ***  **   *   ** **  **     
(0.31) (0.32)  (0.66) (0.63)  (0.32) (0.36)  (0.46) (0.301)  (0.68) (0.66)  (0.34) (0.39) 
Financial 
Flexibility 
 
-0.349 -0.318  -0.291 -0.203  -0.422 -0.337  -0.260 -0.134  -0.222 -0.137  -0.390 -0.351 
   *   *** *  *      ** ** 
(0.27) (0.24)  (0.13) (0.12)  (0.20) (0.21)  (0.14) (0.13)  (0.17) (0.14)  (0.23) (0.25) 
Size 
 
 
0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
                 
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Book-to 
-Market 
Value 
1.637 1.548  1.216 1.009  2.123 1.829  1.738 1.602  1.518 1.117  1.952 1.720 
*** **  ** **  *** ***  ** **  *** **  *** ** 
(0.62) (0.65)  (0.54) (0.47)  (0.76) (0.68)  (0.65) (0.67)  (0.52) (0.52)  (0.74) (0.73) 
# Obs. 2855 2838   2855 2855   589 578   2855 2838   2855 2855   589 578 
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Wald 2103 2503  1975 2762  173 254  2234 2610  2856 2176  314 251 
AR(1) 0.04 0.02  0.02 0.09  0.01 0.03  0.03 0.03  0.01 0.06  0.02 0.01 
AR(2) 0.15 0.24  0.31 0.24  0.36 0.42  0.27 0.18  0.47 0.16  0.27 0.35 
Hansen J 0.48 0.41  0.40 0.48  0.22 0.27  0.33 0.34  0.21 0.25  0.29 0.16 
Hansen C 0.55 0.32   0.42 0.41   0.12 0.19   0.12 0.38   0.39 0.28   0.24 0.18 
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 
Note: This table summarizes the results from the dynamic panel GMM model of stock performance for year+1 and year+2 following a merger announcement on 
marketing, information asymmetry, lagged stock performance, and controls. The dependent variable, Performance, is either short- or long-term stock 
performance. Short-term performance (k=1) uses 12 consecutive monthly stock returns starting from the January after a merger is announced. Long-term 
performance uses 24 (k=2) consecutive monthly stock returns. Marketing is the difference between the marketing intensity of a focal firm and industry average. 
Industries are identified using two-digit SIC codes. Information Asymmetry is either IA_anno, the standard deviation of the market-adjusted, three-day (-1, +1) 
abnormal returns around the merger announcement, or IA_resi𝑡 , the standard deviation of the market-adjusted daily stock price abnormal return in the merger 
announcement year. CONTROL is a vector of control variables including Financial Flexibility, a ratio of the sum of debt in current liabilities, long-term debt, 
and cash to total assets; Size, the relative size of the firms measured by the relative equity; Book-to-Market Ratio, a ratio of the natural log of book value of 
common stock to the natural log of the product of number of shares outstanding and end-of-year stock price. The Wald 𝜒2statistics show the model fit. The AR(1) 
and AR(2) statistics are used to test serial correlation and Hansen J and Hansen C statistics are used to test the validity of instrument variable. The p-values are 
reported for all serial correlation and instrument validity tests.  
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Table 8 also reveals, with respect to non-hypothesized effects for withdrawn sample, that 
marketing has a positive effect (year+1: 2.145), information asymmetry has a negative effect 
(year+1: -2.296), and the interaction term has a significant positive effect (year+1: 1.197) of 
stock return. Collectively, this may indicate that when a firm fails to complete a merger, an 
aggressive marketing can be interpreted as a recovery effort in order to reduce the negative 
effects of the news in the financial market. For investors, the cancellation of the merger proposal 
reveals negative information about the merging firms such as poor growth opportunity or 
incompetency of management. Chi-square tests indicate that the net impact of marketing, 
calculated as a sum of three coefficients of the direct and indirect effects (1.046), is statistically 
positive and different from zero at the 5 percent level. This noteworthy finding suggests that a 
marketing manager at such a firm may adopt a more aggressive marketing post-cancellation to 
prevent potential performance loss. In addition, this finding further supports H3 because the 
withdrawn sample is also a subject of higher information asymmetry in year t as shown in Table 
5. This finding confirms that adopting a marketing investment decision that considers the degree 
of information asymmetry may be an important part of strategy with respect to firm value. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
Discussion 
The objective of this study is to examine whether and how mergers influence marketing 
investment and its impact on firm performance in financial market. Acquirers use large amounts 
of capital for merger transactions that otherwise could finance new marketing projects. I examine 
whether acquirers are willing to invest more in marketing and whether such spend compensates. 
I find that, on average, acquirers invest significantly less in marketing than their rivals post-
merger. By using a dynamic panel GMM method, I show that acquirers would gain significantly 
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if they invested more than their competitors. However, not all acquirers benefit equally. The 
results demonstrate the contingent role of information asymmetry on a subset of main effects. I 
observe that the impact of marketing investment is stronger and longer when the degree of 
information is high. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
This study enriches the market-based assets literature (Srivastava et al. 1998) by 
demonstrating the role of marketing investment in a merger. To the best of knowledge, this study 
is one of the first to link marketing investments with a merger transaction and firm value. This 
unique perspective offers important insights into marketing strategy and performance of 
acquiring firms. However, the findings are not limited to mergers and acquisitions. For example, 
they could be extended to other strategic decisions of a firm under the circumstances in which 
the necessity of aggressive marketing competes with financial inflexibility. In addition, this study 
adopts the emerging contingency perspective by theoretically addressing and empirically 
showing that the degree of information asymmetry moderates the relationship.  
Furthermore, the findings advance empirical research on mergers and acquisitions on 
several fronts. First, I show the potential of the market-based asset framework in resolving 
complex problems, such as merger success. Strategic fit and integration procedure are among the 
most important and widely studied factors affecting merger success. However, this study 
presents strong support for marketing investment as an unidentified key variable (King et al. 
2004) in explaining the merger gain. Second, whereas most prior empirical studies have modeled 
successful acquirers only, this article introduces a new benchmark sample with withdrawn 
merger deals. This novel comparison of two groups may contribute to the literature by offering 
more options to marketing scholars. Finally, I use robust economic models, dynamic panel GMM, 
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to reveal the moderated, simultaneously endogenous, and heterogeneous effects of post-merger 
marketing spending.  
 
Managerial Implications 
It has been said that acquirers’ attention is more likely to be taken away as they are 
dealing with suddenly increased firm size, new environments, and complicated integration tasks 
and managers are more likely to have fewer resources available for marketing strategy. In fact, 
the results show that combined firms significantly decrease marketing investment post-merger. 
However, I advocate the opposite. Executives may consider allocating capital to marketing for at 
least two reasons. First, aggressive marketing limits uncertainty about the merger decision. 
Second, business performance can be improved due to the signaling role of marketing. However, 
firms have finite resources in post-merger years, hindering their willingness to invest. A typical 
observation is that a firm prioritizes investment by sorting it into necessity and discretionary. 
What’s usually missing is a careful cost-benefit analysis that establishes the credibility of 
marketing investment. This study helps acquiring firm managers understand intricacies of the 
post-merger marketing. Although the opportunity cost tends to increase sharply, it would be 
disastrous for an acquirer to cut marketing investments. 
Accordingly, I provide several prescriptive guidelines. First, post-merger marketing 
programs should be designed in the most efficient and effective way. Acquirers already have the 
financial influence of the merger. However, recognizing that post-merger investments enhance 
firm value, acquirers can benefit from devoting more resources to pre-determined marketing 
strategies. Second, clear communication about the rationale for the merger and the ensuing 
marketing investment to customers and investors decreases concerns. Past studies highlight the 
importance of a firm’s information disclosure strategy in several contexts (Mizik and Jacobson 
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2007; Swaminathan et al. 2008; Kurt and Hulland 2013). Third, the findings suggest that firms 
need to ensure that they have superiority with respect to industry rivals’ marketing investments. 
Neither benchmarking nor investing more is a trivial task for the acquirer. Yet the findings 
suggest that such extra marketing efforts may be worthwhile. Finally, this research highlights the 
need for an immediate advertising investment, as suggested by Tables 7 and 8. In sum, when 
designing post-merger marketing project, managers need to allocate budgets while accounting 
for its effectiveness, rivals’ investment, information asymmetry, and shorter-term time horizon of 
execution.  
 
Limitations 
This study has several limitations. First, the use of advertising expenditure as a proxy is 
limited. Although I believe advertising captures a more relevant facet of marketing in a merger 
context (McAlister et al. 2007), it would be worthwhile to examine the importance of marketing 
as a source of information in several directions. For example, in some industries, the role of 
advertising may be limited, and future studies may wish to employ alternative measures. Future 
research also may explore the importance of the quality of marketing. Second, this study 
suggests that acquirers can outperform competitors as a result of the communication with 
investors. If so, what other kind of channels of communication are common? For firms with poor 
advertising or that are in industries in which advertising is less effective, other sources of 
information, such as R&D and production capability (Capron and Hulland 1999; Prabhu et al. 
2005), or the official statement of executive managers when announcing a merger can be of 
worthy of attention. 
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CHAPTER 3 – ESSAY 2: POST-MERGER RETURNS TO MARKETING 
PRODUCTIVITY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 This dissertation focuses on understanding marketing accountability by investigating the 
links among marketing investments, marketing productivity, and firm value. While the relations 
between marketing investments and firm value is studied in the previous chapter, less is explored 
about the links between marketing productivity and firm value. The current chapter examines the 
relationships by analyzing 1) the sources and effects of merger-induced changes in marketing 
productivity, and 2) the links between marketing and other functions in creating firm value and 
competitive advantage. 
 Researchers have recently begun to measure marketing productivity (for a summary, see 
Rust et al. 2004). However, there are three main challenges to estimating marketing productivity 
that researchers face: 1) investigating the long-term effect of marketing actions (Dekimpe and 
Hanssens 1995), 2) disentangling the individual effect of marketing actions from other functional 
actions (Bonoma and Clark 1998), and 3) justifying marketing actions with both financial and 
nonfinancial metrics (Marketing Science Institute, 2000). Despite a number of attempts at 
modeling marketing credibility, comprehensive approaches are lacking (Rust et al. 2004). The 
dearth of research in this area is primarily because most studies have only emphasized discrete 
facets of marketing productivity (Table 1 and 2). As such, theoretical and empirical analysis, 
which would provide a marketing manager with holistic assessment and diagnosis and also 
implementable guidelines, are needed. The capability approaches taken by Dutta et al. (1999) 
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and Narasimhan et al. (2006) are exceptions. In these studies the authors measure the capability 
of marketing and other functional areas in tandem. To the best of knowledge, these are the first 
empirical analyses that provide accounts of multi-faceted aspects of marketing productivity. 
However, these studies still lack practical guidelines tailored to marketing managers. To address 
the aforementioned gaps in the literature, the current study designs a test and then provides 
empirical evidence while considering a firm’s marketing investment, marketing productivity, and 
firm value. In particular, the study focuses on two aims: 1) the relation between marketing spend 
and marketing productivity post-merger, and 2) the impacts of changes in marketing productivity 
on firm value. 
 To investigate these aims, I use data from several sources including the Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC)’s Thompson Merger and Acquisition database, COMPUSTAT of Standard & 
Poor’s, and Chicago Booth’s Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The final sample 
consists of 153 public U.S. acquirers in chemical and rubber, and electronic equipment and 
automotive industry. These specific industries are chosen because they are characterized by 
intensive use of marketing assets as well as other functional assets. Because the relations and 
changes between marketing investment, marketing productivity, and firm value through a merger 
are of great importance, focusing on these markets provides an ideal research setting. In addition, 
an empirical method that can accommodate the unique characteristics of the merged dataset is 
required. Therefore, I utilize the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to measure marketing 
productivity. This method allows for the identification of a set of action priorities for marketing 
managers and quantification of the gains of implementing such strategies.  
 An initial examination of the data shows that, on average, mergers lead to acquirers’ 
significant disinvestment in their marketing post-merger. However, empirical results show that, 
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in fact, increases in marketing are associated with increases in sales post-merger. As predicted in 
microeconomics literature by the law of diminishing returns to scale, it is clear that the 
productivity increases as the quantity of inputs used decreases. The increase in productivity post-
merger may demonstrate the usefulness of a disinvestment, however, firms that reduce their 
marketing investment may face a loss of stock returns. Specifically, the empirical results show a 
negative association between the productivity increase and firm value. This juxtaposition could 
lead to difficult decisions for the marketing manager. In sum, superior marketing investment is 
more likely to lower the level of marketing productivity, but this low productivity tends to 
achieve higher stock prices. Theoretical valuation for the negative association between marketing 
productivity and firm value is that the financial markets selectively perceive information 
contained in marketing investment about the future marketing productivity, and resultant, future 
firm value. Investors, acknowledging the law of diminishing returns, may place less weight on 
the potential changes in productivity because they believe that productivity reduction is 
inevitable during the merger process and, as such, productivity adjustment may be less indicative 
of future prospects. As discussed in Chapter 2, investors view an increase in marketing 
investment as a credible tool managers can use in order to reduce the degree of information 
asymmetry and to maintain competitive advantage, especially in the post-merger period. 
 The objective of this study is to understand the link between marketing investment, 
marketing productivity, and firm value. An empirical investigation is conducted to measure 
marketing and other functional areas’ productivity. This study articulates a measurement and an 
empirical approach that offers a set of actionable guidelines for marketing managers. Thus, the 
contribution of this study is twofold: the provision of holistic assessment and diagnosis, and a set 
of actionable and implementable guidelines. 
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3.2 Conceptual Framework 
 
Resource-Based View and M&A 
 I develop a theoretical model based on the resource-based view (RBV). The RBV 
explains why firms have different performance expectations by highlighting the importance of 
particular resources owned and controlled by a firm (Barney 199; Wernerfelt 1984). A firm 
generates more economic value than competitors by taking advantage of different bundles of 
resources (e.g., marketing). Barney (1991) identifies four resource requirements to achieve 
sustainable competitive advantage: valuable, rare, imperfectly immobile, and unsustainable 
attributes. According to the RBV, a merger and acquisition occurs because resources are both 
heterogeneous and imperfectly mobile and, subsequently, competitive advantage generates at the 
specific firm level. In responding to competitive demands, mergers are often used as a way to 
acquire a pertinent target with unique resources (Capron and Hulland 1999; Homburg and 
Bucerius 2005; Sorescu et al. 2007; Swaminathan et al. 2008). Acquisitions provide an important 
means to capture growth opportunity by creating value from combining existing and newly 
obtained resources. Through mergers and acquisitions, both merging firms avoid having to deal 
with the limits of the internal development of growth opportunity that they might have faced 
without a merger. 
 This study examines shocks (merger and acquisition) to a firm to assess the impact of 
changes in a firm’s investment and productivity on firm value. The performance assessment of a 
firm is an important research domain considered in several literatures including marketing, 
strategy, economics, finance, and accounting. For example, Murthi et al. (1996) point out three 
dimensions of marketing: 1) input resources that are necessary for the production of desired 
output, 2) output objectives that differentiate a firm relative to its rivals, and 3) efficiency, which 
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refers to a firm’s ability to deploy inputs to achieve the output. In general, productivity is defined 
as a ratio of outputs to inputs. This study adopts the input-output approach similar to the 
functional capabilities proposed by Dutta et al. (1999). These authors conceptualize a firm in the 
high-technology industry as consisting of systems including marketing, R&D, and operation 
capabilities to explain interfirm profitability heterogeneity. Although I follow established models 
(Murthi et al. 1996; Dutta et al. 1999), this study advances the framework by explicitly including 
shocks that create modifications in input, output, and productivity. Because this model includes 
shocks, it requires a different conceptualization, which includes combining the variables (input, 
output, and productivity) of both merging firms (acquirer and target) into a single model. This 
new conceptualization allows for inferences to be drawn about the relations and changes among 
variables as a direct result of a merger and acquisition. To the extent that acquiring scarce and 
imperfectly immobile resources is the ultimate objective of a merger, it is imperative to construct 
the model by integrating the productivity of both firms. I also use a second-stage approach that 
conceptualizes stock return as an output variable, instead of profit (Dutta et al. 1999; Narasimhan 
et al. 2006). This modification is primarily motivated by an interest in financial market outcomes. 
Given that the merger increases uncertainty, the shifts in investment and productivity are of a 
particular interest to researchers and to practitioners. In addition, it is critical to use output 
metrics that are independent of variables used in the first-stage analysis as inputs or outputs, in 
order to restore a valid measure of productivity.  
 The following sections introduce the input resources and output objectives used in the 
first-stage to estimate productivity measures. 9 To build a portfolio of inputs and outputs, the 
                                                 
9 The dependent variables of productivity equations are defined following recommendations set forth by Dutta et al. 
(1999) and Narasimhan et al. (2006). 
 
  
48 
first-stage considers marketing, Research & Development (R&D), and operation assets, both 
tangible and intangible.  
 
Marketing Productivity 
 Sevin (1965) defines marketing productivity as “the sales or profit per unit of marketing 
effort”. In the studies on the utility and operationalization of marketing, marketing effort is 
classified into several actions such as advertising, supply chain management, innovation, and 
customer relations (Dutta et al. 1999; Narasimhan et al. 2006). In keeping with the research 
tradition (Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009; Steenkamp and Fang 2011; Kurt and Hulland 2013), I 
use such marketing activities as input variables to model marketing productivity. A firm that 
spends more on advertising campaigns will be able to achieve superior sales by increasing 
customer awareness and brand equity. For example, because customers are already familiar with 
the product, advertising can supplement the selling effort of salesperson. With an increased 
brand equity and loyalty, marketing can serve as an entry barrier. Better customer relations 
enables a firm to be better at identifying customer needs, and will thus be better at targeting and 
positioning. Because the status of a company's relationship with customer is accurately tracked, 
companies can achieve more and faster sales and higher customer retention and satisfaction. 
Furthermore, R&D can help a frim build advantage over its competitors by bringing innovative 
products and services to the market, which leads to a sharp increase in market participation and 
sales (Prabhu et al. 2005). Firms with higher marketing productivity can carry out better sales 
forecasting and respond quickly to changes in order to capitalize on new opportunities. Hence, 
above discussion and insights from the literature allow for a formulation of marketing 
productivity as a function of:  
 Sales = f (Adverting Capital, Marketing Capital, R&D Capital, Customer Base) 
  
49 
 
R&D Productivity 
 The primary goal of R&D is the creation of new body of knowledge about existing 
products or processes, or the creation of an entirely new product (Prabhu et al. 2005). By 
definition, R&D investment is the single most essential input to developing innovations (Dutta et 
al. 1999; Narasimhan et al. 2006). Another important input is a firm’s marketing productivity. In 
fact, a firm with stronger marketing assets better understands customer experience, and therefore, 
can better identify promising innovation opportunities. Marketing can further increases R&D 
output by providing directions to differentiating a firm’s product (Erickson et al. 1992). The 
R&D output has been frequently measured in the literature using patent counts (Dutta et al. 1999) 
because patent rights can give monopoly power to a firm. Patent plays a critical role in achieving 
a superior competitive advantage and establishing an entry barrier for manufacturers in the 
markets under investigation in this study (Mizik and Jacobson 2003). Furthermore, acquiring 
patent rights and/or resolving patent dispute through a merger is one of popular strategies to 
reduce competition. I follow an approach that uses the quality-adjusted patent10 as an output 
variable in measuring R&D productivity to overcome some shortcomings of the raw patent data 
(Dutta et al. 1999). Hence, above discussion and insights from the literature allow for a 
formulation of R&D productivity as a function of:  
 Quality-adjusted Patent = f (R&D Capital, Marketing Productivity, Patent Base) 
 
Operation Productivity 
 Operation productivity refers to cost minimization (Dutta et al. 1999; Narasimhan et al. 
2006), rather than production maximization. Hence, I use production cost minimization as an 
                                                 
10 This measure uses the number of times a patent has been cited to count for the innovativeness of R&D technology, 
which allows for incorporating two dimensions of R&D outputs: innovativeness and applicability. 
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output objective in measuring operation productivity. Following microeconomic theory, factor 
prices such as labor and capital costs are considered input variables (Banker et al. 1984; Charnes 
et al. 1978). Another key driver is a firm’s R&D assets because technology can lead to a lower 
cost structure. A firm’s technological assets play a critical role in shaping a firm’s production 
process, which contributes to higher operation productivity. Finally, marketing can help the 
operational function of a firm by providing insights about customer behavior. A firm with 
stronger marketing assets better understands customers’ buying behavior, and therefore, will be 
able to control inventory better than competitors. This ultimately can drop costs related to selling, 
storage, and shipping (Dutta et al. 1999; Narasimhan et al. 2006). Hence, above discussion and 
insights from the literature allow for a formulation of operation productivity as a function of:  
 Production Cost = f (Labor Cost, Capital Cost, R&D Capital, Marketing Productivity) 
 
Productivity, Mergers, and Firm Value 
 There is a growing literature in marketing, finance, and accounting that investigates the 
relations between a firm’s marketing and firm performance (Table 1 and 2), using a multitude 
approach and various measures. Conventional wisdom is that a firm’s tangible and intangible 
marketing assets are associated with higher stock prices, lower production costs, and greater 
innovative efficiencies. However, as RBV posits, a firm’s input resources and output objectives 
are unique and difficult to internally grow or imitate. Merger can be a solution because it is a 
process whereby two organizations integrate into one entity to strengthen their competitive 
advantage by blending core assets. The first-stage analysis allows for a comparison of 
productivity changes in a firm’s marketing, R&D, and operation functions pre- and post-merger.  
 The second-stage explores how productivity of a firm fosters value creation in a merger 
by testing the key links between productivity changes, and stock performance. It is important to 
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note that the dependent variable in the second-stage should be independent of the input-output 
variables used in the first-stage and, at the same time, the scale of operation. Because I use 
individual expenses and sales as input-output in the first-stage, usual accounting items and 
product market-related performance measures (e.g. net income and market share) that aggregate 
expenses and revenue are not appropriate to be used as a dependent variable in the second-stage. 
Because the primary interest of this study lies on firm value, I used stock return.11 In addition to 
direct impacts, interactions between marketing, R&D, and operation productivity are examined 
because these three functions can serve as complements in enhancing firm value. Hence, above 
discussion and insights from the literature allow for a formulation of operation productivity as a 
function of:  
 Stock Performance = f (Marketing Productivity, R&D Productivity,  
   Operation Productivity, Marketing Productivity* R&D Productivity,  
   Marketing Productivity* Operation Productivity) 
 
3.3 Data and Measures 
 
Sample 
 The conceptual framework is based on the resource-based view of a firm’s existing and 
newly acquired resources and the impacts of a combination of these resources on a firm’s stock 
prices. This requires comprehensive data on an acquirer’s current and past resources, outputs, 
and corresponding firm value. Therefore, data are drawn from several sources for the current 
study. The majority of the data are from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Thompson 
Merger and Acquisition database between 1990 and 2010. In addition, the COMPUSTAT of 
                                                 
11 Possible alternatives are earnings per share and the market value of equity. However, earning per share is a noisy 
output because it is calculated based on net income. Because the marketing value of equity is affected by many 
factors, I use the abnormal stock returns as a dependent variable in the second-stage.  
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Standard & Poor’s is used to collect acquirers’ annual financial/accounting information including 
marketing investments, sales revenue, and other control variables. The Chicago Booth’s Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) is used to collect stock market–related data to estimate 
short- and long-term stock returns. The final sample for the study consists of 153 public U.S. 
acquirers in chemical and rubbers (SIC codes 2800 through 3099) and electronic equipment and 
automotive (SIC codes 3600 through 3799) industry. The industries were chosen because they 
are characterized by intensive use of marketing assets relative to other functional actions, and, 
therefore, marketing-related issues serve as one of the fundamental motivations to merge. In 
these markets, incentives to salespersons, customer relations efforts, and trade incentives are of 
great importance. Because the primary interest of this study lies in the relations and changes 
between marketing investment, marketing productivity, and firm value during a merger, focusing 
on these markets provides an ideal research setting. 
 
Measures 
 I focus on both short- and long-term financial market performance. First, I estimate 
annual stock return by compounding the monthly stock returns for a given fiscal year. Short-term 
performance uses 12 consecutive monthly stock returns starting from the January after a merger 
is announced. Long-term performance uses 24 (2-year) consecutive monthly stock returns.12 
Marketing Output is the dollar amount of a firm’s sale, reduced by trade discounts and cash. 
Operation Output is the dollar amount of a firm’s cost of goods sold. These proxies are chosen 
because the foremost goals of marketing and operation activities are to maximize sales revenue 
and minimize the production cost, respectively. R&D Output is the citation-weighted patent 
                                                 
12 To control for the value risk (Fama and French 1993), I use the risk-adjusted abnormal stock return, However, the 
overall findings remain unchanged by the use of size-adjusted or equally weighted market portfolio (Mizik and 
Jacobson 2007; Mizik 2010). 
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count13 to capture the innovativeness of R&D output by measuring the number of citations the 
patent has within and outside a firm’s industry. The weight is calculated as the ratio between the 
number of citations a patent has and the average number of citations a firm has for all patents 
belonging to the firm. Table 9 presents the descriptive statistics for the study focal variables. 
 
Table 9 
Descriptive Statistics  
  Mean  Median STD 
Advertising (million $) 
 
SG&A (million $) 
       134.32   
 
       156.65 
      112.68 
 
       162.95 
  188.62 
 
  164.85 
 
R&D (million $)        107.57          98.26    204.04 
 
Cost of Goods Sold (million $) 166,324.76 204,123.83 5,204.51 
 
Sales (million $) 
 
Citation-Weighted Patent (annual) 
22,379.59 
 
       47.97 
   27,158.57 
  
         49.21 
6,485.52 
 
   200.09 
Note: This table summarizes the descriptive statistics for measures of Advertising investment, Marketing investment, 
R&D investment, Cost of Goods Sold, Sales, and number of Citation-Weighted Patent for a sample of 153 U.S. 
public acquirers that completed a merger in chemical and rubbers (SIC codes 2800 through 3099) and electronic 
equipment and automotive (SIC codes 3600 through 3799) industry between 1986 and 2014.  
  
 Advertising Capital captures the carryover effects of advertising effort by estimating a 
Koyck-lag model. Advertising capital for a firm i at year t is calculated as 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝜆
𝑡−𝑘𝑡
𝑘=1 ∗ 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑘. The higher the value of 𝜆, the greater the 
carryover effects of advertising expenditure from previous periods. Marketing Capital captures 
the carryover effects of marketing effort by estimating a Koyck-lag model. Marketing capital for 
a firm i at year t is calculated as 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 = ∑ γ
𝑡−𝑘𝑡
𝑘=1 ∗ 𝑆𝐺&𝐴 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑘. To 
avoid counting twice in the input vector, R&D expenditure is subtracted from Selling, General 
                                                 
13 This measure requires exhaustive data collection. For example, Narasimhan et al. (2006) use more than 150,000 
patents in their analysis of high-technology firms in semiconductor and computers industry. Similarly, I perform an 
extensive content analysis of over 45,000 patents obtained from the U.S. Patent Office between 1986 and 2014 to 
construct this variable. The data contains all patents for product/process innovation belonging to both merging 
parties (acquirers and target) as well as their competitors in order to estimate a firm’s R&D productivity relative to 
its rivals. Similarly, a firm’s sales, advertising investments, and SG&A investments are obtained from 1986 to 2014 
in order to provide sufficient information to estimate the carry over effect. 
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and Administrative Expenses (SG&A). The higher the value of γ, the greater the carryover 
effects of marketing expenditure from previous periods. R&D Capital captures the carryover 
effects of R&D effort by estimating a Koyck-lag model. R&D capital for a firm i at year t is 
calculated as 𝑅&𝐷 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛿
𝑡−𝑘𝑡
𝑘=1 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑘. The higher the value of 𝛿, the 
greater the carryover effects of R&D expenditure from previous periods. To account for the 
impacts of an existing customer base, Customer Base is estimated by a Koyck-lag model. 
Customer base for a firm i at year t is calculated as 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑡 = ∑ θ
𝑡−𝑘𝑡
𝑘=1 ∗ 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑘. 
The higher the value of θ, the greater the carryover effects of customer base from previous 
periods. Labor Cost is the average wage, measured by dividing the costs of employees’ wages 
and benefits allocated to continuing operations by the number of employees. Capital Cost is 
investment as capital expenditure. Finally, Patent Base for a firm i at year t is calculated as 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡.  
 
3.4 Empirical Analysis and Results 
 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)  
 The approach followed in this study centers on the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a 
technique rooted in microeconomic theory, which uses the optimization method. This 
mathematical programming technique measures the optimally weighted relative productivity in 
converting multiple inputs into multiple outputs of firms operating under similar conditions 
(Banker et al. 1984; Charnes et al. 1978). DEA has been widely used in studying efficiency 
among different branches of a bank (Kamakura et al. 2002), the efficiency focus of firms (Mittal 
et al. 2005), marketing communication credibility (Luo and Donthu 2006), and quantifying 
managerial ability (Demerjian et al. 2012). Efficiency of a firm is measured by comparing the 
inputs and outputs to those of the most efficient firm among those producing similar levels of 
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outputs in the industry. DEA identifies a set of efficient firms and creates a virtual production 
frontier as a convex combination of the firms. A set of efficient firms (or linear combinations of 
firms) operates at the maximum efficiency, given inputs. By calculating the distance of a firm 
under analysis from the virtual frontier, it provides a score of relative efficiency against the set of 
Pareto-efficient observations that can be practically achieved. Firms that are inefficient in their 
use of inputs score less than one while Pareto-efficient firms score closer to one. Thus, the DEA 
efficiency score can be considered the ratio of outputs over inputs and as an ordinal ranking of 
relative efficiency operating in the same industry.  
The main advantage of the nonparametric DEA method is that it accommodates 
economies of scale by only evaluating firms operating at similar input levels, rather than 
comparing firms to all other observations. In doing so, and by incorporating the piecewise linear 
frontier, DEA integrates the nonlinearity in the relationship between inputs and outputs 
(Kamakura et al. 2002). Further, in focusing on revealed best practice among neighbors, this 
technique provides a basis for evaluating the optimality. The second advantage of DEA is that it 
calculates an efficiency score without imposing a prior explicit weighting structure. It does not 
require specification or knowledge of ad hoc weights or prices for both inputs and outputs. In a 
similar vein, it does not depend upon the functional form of a production relationship. Finally, 
the DEA produces a single aggregate measure of a firm’s productive efficiency. Therefore, it is 
possible to estimate desired changes in inputs or outputs for projecting firms below the virtual 
frontier onto the curve. Comparing estimate results from parametric methods, which essentially 
estimate efficiency relative to industry average performance, provides insights into the causes 
and extent of inefficiency. 
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The measure of DEA implicitly emphasizes the allocative efficiency in the sense that all 
inputs contribute to the production and are subject to managerial discretion. Thus, this measure is 
unique in that it emphasizes the role of the manager. In theory, constant evaluation and 
benchmark processes are essential to improving firm performance. Such processes are widely 
used for identification and adoption of the best practices as a means of achieving and 
maintaining competitive advantage. Merger or acquisition is one of the examples of processes 
that firms engage in to maintain and increase competitive advantage. DEA procedure fits well 
with the current competitive market, as firms are seeking to strike the right balance between 
revenue expansion and efficiency improvement simultaneously (Anderson et al. 1997). DEA is 
an appropriate analysis technique as it offers a focus on cost efficiency (producing maximum 
outputs given the inputs) and an emphasis on the allocative efficiency (choosing an optimal set 
of inputs) among other features. 
I apply a basic DEA procedure that is formulated as a fractional programming problem 
and then transformed to linear programming to obtain the values for virtual weights of inputs and 
outputs. For any firm 𝜃, DEA solves: 
Max  
∑𝑗𝑢𝑗𝑦𝑗θ
∑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖θ
  , 
subject to 
∑𝑗𝑢𝑗𝑦𝑗θ
∑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖θ
 ≤ 1, and 𝑢𝑗 , 𝑣𝑖  ≥ 0                                         (3) 
where 𝑥𝑖θ is the value of input i for firm 𝜃 and 𝑦𝑗θ is the value of output j for firm 𝜃. The 
objective is to obtain weights (𝑣𝑖 and 𝑢𝑗). Once optimal weights are derived, then the result 
yields a ratio scaled efficiency score for each firm 𝜃, ranging from 0 to 1.  
 It is important to note that, as a benchmark, I also include firms in the same industry that 
are not involved in a merger activity in the given year. This enables me to identify the Pareto-
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efficient unit and to compare it to a firm under analysis. Specifically, the analysis focuses on five 
“local” observations in terms of input scales, as a Pareto-efficient firm can be considered as a 
local maximum, having a similar amount of input. An acquisition achieves superior performance 
compared to its competitor in similar conditions, rather than guarantees a maximum output level 
or relative productivity on the market. This implies that benchmark samples do not consist of the 
same observations for the pre- and post-periods since the acquirers’ input levels adjust after a 
merger by nature. More importantly, the Pareto-efficient firms are considered as “optimal” in the 
sense that they are achieving maximum efficiency given similar levels of multiple inputs. If a 
firm uses fewer resources compared to other firms without sacrificing its output after a merger, it 
is considered successful and effective. Otherwise, it is unsuccessful and an inefficient investment. 
Thus, successful acquirers represent the best-practice frontier that optimally reconfigures a firm’s 
resources to produce goods. The improvement may be the result of benchmark processes that a 
merger or acquisition usually provide by absorbing capabilities from the target. 
 
Measuring Marketing Productivity  
 Marketing productivity is estimated by the Cobb-Douglas functional form as follows: 
ln(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0
𝑚 +  𝛽1
𝑚 ∗  ln(𝐴𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2
𝑚 ∗  ln(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽3
𝑚 ∗  ln(𝑅&𝐷 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4
𝑚 ∗  ln(𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒)𝑖𝑡 
+𝜂𝑖𝑡
𝑚 − 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑚                                                                              (4) 
where i stands for firm, t for time (year). The coefficient 𝛽1
𝑚 measures the marginal productivity 
of advertising capital. This represents how sales changes as advertising capital changes. 
Similarly, the coefficients 𝛽2
𝑚 through 𝛽4
𝑚 are elasticities of corresponding independent variables. 
If sales exhibits diminishing marginal productivity, then these marginal productivity measures 
(𝛽1
𝑚 through 𝛽4
𝑚) are expected to have positive values. The 𝜂𝑖𝑡
𝑚 is a random error representing all 
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unobservable components of the dependent variable. Finally, the 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑚 is of primary interest 
because it gauges the inefficiency in marketing of a firm i at time t.  
 
Measuring R&D Productivity  
 R&D productivity is estimated by the Cobb-Douglas functional form as follows: 
ln(𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑖𝑡
=  𝛽0
𝑟 +  𝛽1
𝑟 ∗  ln(𝑅&𝐷 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2
𝑟 ∗  ln(𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒)𝑖𝑡                           
+  𝛽3
𝑟 ∗  ln(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡
𝑟 − 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑟                          (5) 
where i stands for firm, t for time (year). The coefficient 𝛽1
𝑟 measures the marginal productivity 
of R&D capital. This represents how the numbers of citation-weighted patents change as R&D 
capital changes. Similarly, the coefficients 𝛽2
𝑟 and 𝛽3
𝑟 are elasticities of corresponding 
independent variables. If the number of citation-weighted patents exhibit diminishing marginal 
productivity, then these marginal productivity measures (𝛽1
𝑟 through 𝛽3
𝑟) are expected to have 
positive values. The 𝜂𝑖𝑡
𝑟  is a random error representing all unobservable components of the 
dependent variable. Finally, the 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑟  is of primary interest because it gauges the inefficiency in 
R&D of a firm.  
 
Measuring Operation Productivity  
 Operation productivity is estimated by the Cobb-Douglas functional form as follows: 
ln(𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆)𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0
𝑜 +  𝛽1
𝑜 ∗  ln(𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2
𝑜 ∗  ln(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡)𝑖𝑡                                
+  𝛽3
𝑜 ∗  ln(𝑅&𝐷 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4
𝑜 ∗  ln(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖𝑡 
+𝜂𝑖𝑡
𝑜 − 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑜                                                                                       (6) 
where i stands for firm, t for time (year). The coefficient 𝛽1
𝑜 measures the marginal productivity 
of labor cost. This represents how the cost of production changes as labor cost changes. Similarly, 
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the coefficients 𝛽2
𝑜 through 𝛽4
𝑜 are elasticities of corresponding independent variables. If cost 
exhibits diminishing marginal productivity, then these marginal productivity measures (𝛽1
𝑜 
through 𝛽4
𝑜) are expected to have positive values. The 𝜂𝑖𝑡
𝑜  is a random error representing all 
unobservable components of the dependent variable. Finally, the 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑜  is of primary interest 
because it gauges the inefficiency in operation of a firm.  
 
Modeling the Relation between Functional Productivity and Firm Value 
 The relation among functional productivities and firm value is estimated as follows: 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
=  𝛽0
𝑡 +  𝛽1
𝑣 ∗  𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2
𝑣 ∗  𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽3
𝑣 ∗  𝑅&𝐷 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4
𝑣 ∗  𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡                     
+  𝛽5
𝑣 ∗  𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗  𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡           +  𝛽6
𝑣
∗  𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗  𝑅&𝐷 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑣              (7) 
where i stands for firm, t for time (year). The model also controls for the merger type and year 
and industry. The coefficients 𝛽2
𝑣 thorough 𝛽4
𝑣 measure the impact of a firm’s marketing, R&D, 
and operation productivity on firm stock performance. The coefficient 𝛽5
𝑣 measures the 
interaction between a firm’s marketing and operation productivity and the coefficient 𝛽6
𝑣 
measures the interaction between a firm’s marketing and R&D productivity. Note that the 
coefficient 𝛽1
𝑣 measures the persistence of stock prices. To account for the impact of the lagged 
dependent variable, I use a difference GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991; Arellano and 
Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998), which involves the first-differencing and the use of 
historical values of the endogenous variable as instruments. This analysis employs a two-stage 
(2SLS) approach similar to methods used in Chapter 2 in order to incorporate heterogeneity and 
endogeneity. 
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Results  
 Table 5 in Chapter 2 presents how marketing investments of an acquirer peak in a merger 
year compared to non-merger years. Similarly, Table 10 presents how an acquirer’s investments 
in advertising, marketing, and R&D fluctuate for three years surrounding a merger 
announcement. The top panel of Table 10 shows the results using the size-adjusted investments 
and the bottom panel of Table 10 shows the results using the size- and industry-adjusted 
investments. The size-adjusted investment is the yearly investment in each functional area 
relative to total asset. The size- and industry-adjusted investment is calculated by subtracting the 
industry average of the size-adjusted investment for all firms operating in the same industry from 
the size-adjusted investment of a focal firm. Industries are identified using their two-digit SIC 
codes.  
 
Table 10 
Advertising, Marketing, and R&D Investments through a Merger   
  
(1) (2) (3)   Difference 
year t-1 year t year t+1 
 
(2) - (1) (3) - (2) 
Size-Adjusted Values 
Advertising Investment 5.43%*** 6.84%*** 3.37%*** 
 
1.41%***   -3.47%*** 
Marketing Investment 5.32%*** 6.94%*** 3.10%*** 
 
1.62%***   -3.84%*** 
R&D Investment 5.35%*** 6.94%*** 4.94%*** 
 
1.59%*** -2.00%** 
Size- and Industry-Adjusted Values 
Advertising Investment 3.44%*** -1.24%*** -5.51%*** 
 
-4.68%***      -4.27%*** 
Marketing Investment 1.56%*** -1.58%*** -4.65%*** 
 
-3.14%***     -3.07%** 
R&D Investment 2.14%*** -1.87%*** -5.26%***   -4.01%***  -3.39%*** 
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 
Note: This table summarizes an acquirer’s investments in advertising, SG&A, and R&D respectively, for three years 
surrounding a merger announcement year. The size-adjusted investment is the yearly investment in each functional 
area relative to total asset. The size- and industry-adjusted investment is calculated by subtracting the industry 
average of the size-adjusted investment for all firms operating in the same industry from the size-adjusted 
investment of a focal firm. Industries are identified using two-digit SIC codes. 
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The results in the top panel show that acquirers significantly increase their investment in 
advertising, marketing, and R&D pre-merger (Column 5), while they significantly decrease in all 
three functional areas post-merger (Column 6). This is consistent with the findings presented in 
Chapter 2. However, the results of size- and industry-adjusted investment in the bottom panel of 
Table 10 indicate that, on average, chemical and rubbers, and electronic equipment and 
automotive acquirers significantly decrease their investments even in the merger year compared 
to a year prior a merger announcement (Column 5). These patterns contrast with results in the 
top panel of Table 10 and results that compare the unadjusted raw changes in advertising, 
marketing, and R&D investments, which are not reported here. In these untabulated results, raw 
changes in investments exhibit a monotonically increasing tendency over the years, from year t-1 
though year t+1. Taken together, the results suggest that acquirers appear to increase their 
investments in three functional areas at first glance, however, after controlling for firms’ size and 
competition, acquirers tend to reduce their investments in a merger year and a year following a 
merger announcement. 
 Next, I apply the DEA model to a sample of 153 firms to estimate three functional 
frontiers, outlined in equations (4) through (6). The DEA provides a score of relative 
productivity, based on the ratio of outputs over inputs, against the set of Pareto-efficient 
observations that can be achieved in the same industry. Firms that are inefficient score less than 
one while Pareto-efficient firms score closer to one. The results provide the coefficients of input 
resources on its relevant output components as well as the measure of the three functional 
productivity scores. Table 11 summarizes the results from the DEA estimation of equations (4) 
through (6) for the entire sample pre- and post-merger.14 
                                                 
14 The DEA estimation offers diagnostics to managers in terms of the level of inputs that are overused to produce 
each firm’s current production. Accordingly, one can improve its production level by reassigning a fraction of the 
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Table 11 
DEA Estimation Results: Parameter Estimates of Marketing, R&D, and Operation Productivity 
Pre- and Post-Merger 
 
  
(1) (2)   Difference 
Pre-merger 
(year t-1) 
Post-merger 
(year t+1)   
(2) - (1) 
((year t+1) – (year t-1)) 
Panel 1: Marketing Frontier (DV: Sale) 
        Coefficient Estimate 
                Advertising Capital     0.529***      0.578*** 
 
 
                Marketing Capital     0.736***       0.725*** 
 
 
                 R&D Capital 0.439*   0.384* 
 
 
                 Customer Base  0.349*   0.352*    
 Productivity Estimate     
                 Average Marketing  
                 Productivity Score 
0.8462 0.8700   0.0208*** 
Panel 2: R&D Frontier (DV: Patent) 
        Coefficient Estimate 
                  R&D Capital       0.725***       0.696*** 
 
 
                  Patent Base     0.429**     0.430** 
 
 
                  Marketing Productivity     0.483**     0.515**    
 Productivity Estimate     
                 Average R&D 
                 Productivity Score 
0.7817 0.7901   0.0096 
Panel 3: Operation Frontier (DV: COGS) 
        Coefficient Estimate 
                  Labor Cost    0.442**    0.561** 
 
 
                  Capital Cost     0.489**      0.632*** 
 
 
                  R&D Capital  0.310*  0.301* 
 
 
                  Marketing Productivity  0.294*   0.347*    
 Productivity Estimate     
                  Average Operation 
                  Productivity Score 
0.8225 0.7765   -0.0460*** 
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 
Note: This table summarizes the results from the DEA estimation of marketing (Panel 1), R&D (Panel 2), and 
operation (Panel 3) frontier model (equations 4-6) for the entire sample pre- (year t-1) and post-merger (year t+1). 
The results provide the coefficients of input resource on its relevant output components as well as the estimates of 
the three functional productivity scores. Firms that are inefficient score less than one while Pareto-efficient firms 
score closer to one.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
inputs currently utilized. A detailed discussion of the optimal resource allocation strategy would be beyond the 
scope of this study. Hence, the related results are not reported here. However, I discuss the implications of the 
results. 
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 Marketing Productivity. Both marketing productivity estimates and maximum likelihood 
coefficient estimates of inputs are reported in Panel 1 of Table 11. The results show that firms 
have a higher marketing productivity in the year following a merger (0.8700) relative to in the 
year prior to a merger (0.8562). This finding suggests that firms use their marketing inputs better 
in post-merger. Note that the difference in means (0.0208) is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level.15 This suggests that if the objective of a merger is related to marketing productivity, 
then, on average, acquirers in the chemical and rubbers, and electronic equipment and 
automotive markets are significantly benefited from the merger. To the extent that productivity 
increase is the ultimate goal of the merger, acquirers reap significant productivity rewards via 
economies of scale. In addition, the average marketing productivity score is generally higher 
than the average score of R&D and operation productivity around a merger, which suggests that 
firms are operating relatively well in marketing compared to in the two functional areas. 
 Regarding the coefficient estimates, both advertising and marketing capital variables in 
Panel 1 have a significantly positive impact in both pre- and post-merger periods, implying that 
firms with greater investment in advertising and marketing can achieve a higher level of sales. 
R&D capital is marginally significant pre-merger and becomes insignificant post-merger. Finally, 
customer base has a moderate positive impact in both pre- and post-merger periods, at the 10 
percent level. These findings are consistent with previous results in the marketing literature that 
show that in industries where innovation is less essential, firms need to focus more on market-
oriented strategies, such as advertising, marketing, and customer relations efforts. Results from 
this study build on previous work by measuring how marketing assets relative to R&D assets 
impact a firm’s sales in the chemical and rubbers, and electronic equipment and automotive 
                                                 
15 I use Mann–Whitney U test following the DEA literature (Murthi et al. 1996). Mann–Whitney U test is a rank-
based nonparametric test that can be used to determine if there are statistically significant differences between two 
or more groups of a continuous or ordinal variable. 
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markets. As discussed in the analysis section, the coefficient estimates in the log-log equation 
measure the marginal productivity, representing how sales change as a corresponding 
independent variable changes. For example, the coefficient estimate of advertising capital post-
merger (0.578) indicates that a 1 percent increase in advertising capital increases sales by 
approximately 0.578 percent. Similarly, the elasticities of marketing capital post-merger is 0.725, 
suggesting that a 1 percent increase in marketing capital increases sales by approximately 0.725 
percent.  
 
 R&D Productivity. Both R&D productivity estimates and maximum likelihood 
coefficient estimates of inputs are reported in Panel 2 of Table 11. Results show that firms have 
similar levels of R&D productivity in the pre- and post-merger year. Note that the difference in 
means (0.0096) is statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level. Coming to the coefficient 
estimates, both R&D capital and marketing productivity variables have a significantly positive 
impact in both pre- and post-merger periods, implying that firms with greater investment in R&D 
and marketing can achieve a higher level of sales. The number of patents has a moderate positive 
impact in both pre- and post-merger periods, at the 5 percent level. The coefficient estimate of 
R&D capital post-merger (0.696) indicates that a 1 percent increase in R&D capital increases 
sales by approximately 0.696 percent. Similarly, the elasticities of marketing productivity post-
merger is 0.515, suggesting that a 1 percent increase in marketing productivity increases sales by 
approximately 0.515 percent. Note that the average R&D productivity score is generally lower 
than the productivity of other functional areas. This result has two potential explanations: either 
firms do not recognize that R&D productivity can be improved or they do not appreciate the 
effect of differentiation based on R&D assets. In either case, the results discussed above provide 
meaningful insights for managers. 
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 Operation Productivity. Both operation productivity estimates and maximum likelihood 
coefficient estimates of inputs are reported in Panel 3 of Table 11. Results show that firms have 
lower operation productivity post-merger relative to pre-merger. This finding suggests that firms 
use their operation inputs better during the pre-merger year. Note that the difference in means 
(0.0460) is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This result suggests that if the objective 
of a merger is related to operation productivity then, on average, acquirers are not significantly 
benefited from the merger. Acquirers have failed to reap significant productivity rewards from 
mergers via economies of scale. Regarding the coefficient estimates, both labor and capital cost 
variables have a significantly positive impact in both pre- and post-merger periods, implying that 
firms with greater investments in labor and capital can achieve higher levels of sales. Both R&D 
capital and marketing productivity have a moderate positive impact in both pre- and post-merger 
periods, at the 5 percent level. The coefficient estimate of labor cost post-merger (0.561) 
indicates that a 1 percent increase in labor cost increases sales by approximately 0.561 percent. 
Similarly, the elasticity of capital cost post-merger is 0.632, suggesting that a 1 percent increase 
in capital cost increases sales by approximately 0.632 percent.  
 
 Productivity and Firm Value. This study also focuses on how changes in productivity 
through a merger impact a firm’s stock return. To test these relations, the stock return of a firm in 
year t+1 and year t+2 is separately regressed on changes in three functional productivity 
measures between year t+1 and year t-1. Interactions terms between three productivity measures 
are included to jointly test the effects and the lagged value of stock return is included to account 
for the persistence in stock prices. Table 12 presents the estimation results of the GMM 
estimation outlined in the previous section.  
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 The results indicate that there is a significant negative impact of changes in marketing 
productivity on stock return (year t+1: -0.0259, year t+2: -0.0104), suggesting that increases in 
marketing productivity are associated with lower stock return. There is also a negative 
coefficient on the interaction term between marketing and R&D productivity, (year t+1: -0.0127), 
suggesting that the more positive the changes in marketing productivity in the post-merger 
period, the more negative the association between R&D productivity and firm value. These 
findings are important because they suggest that, even though decreasing marketing investment 
post-merger leads to a higher marketing productivity (as shown in Table 11), the disinvestment 
in marketing may result in lower stock prices. As predicted in microeconomics literature by the 
law of diminishing returns to scale, it is clear that productivity increases as the quantity of inputs 
used decreases. The increase in productivity post-merger may demonstrate the usefulness of a 
disinvestment, however, firms that reduce their marketing investment may face a loss of stock 
returns. Specifically, the empirical results show a negative association between the productivity 
increase and firm value. This juxtaposition could lead to difficult decisions for the marketing 
manager. In sum, superior marketing investment is more likely to lower the level of marketing 
productivity, but this low productivity tends to achieve higher stock prices. To illustrate, I use the 
same example discussed in the previous marketing frontier section. A randomly chosen firm’s 
sales increase approximately by 1 percent as a result of a 10 percent increase in a marketing 
investment post-merger. A further analysis based on the same example suggests that the increase 
in marketing investment leads to approximately a 0.66 percent reduction in marketing 
productivity score (from 0.8948 to 0.8889), and approximately a 3.03 percent increase in stock 
return (from 0.0132 to 0.0136). As was previously noted, this example is essentially explanatory 
in nature. The total effect of resource re-allocation only can be computed individually, depending 
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on the assumption employed for the estimation as well as on several firm- and industry-specific 
factors.  
 
Table 12  
GMM Estimation Results: Parameter Estimates of the Relation between Firm Value and 
Marketing, R&D, and Operation Productivity  
  
Stock Return 
Year t+1 
Stock Return 
Year t+2 
Δ Marketing Productivity Score    -0.0259**     -0.0104* 
Δ R&D Productivity Score    0.0198**    0.0052 
Δ Operation Productivity Score       0.0472***          0.0332*** 
Δ Marketing * Operation Productivity Score       0.0561***        0.0271** 
Δ Marketing * R&D Productivity Score  -0.0127*  -0.0083 
Δ Lagged Stock Return      0.0328**        0.0223** 
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 
Note: This table summarizes the results from the GMM estimation of the relation between firm value and marketing, 
R&D, and operation productivity (equation 7) for the entire sample. The results provide the estimates of the impacts 
each independent variable has on stock return through a merger. The dependent variable is the stock return of a firm 
in year t+1 and year t+2. Stock Return Year t+1 uses 12 consecutive monthly stock returns starting from the 
January after a merger is announced. Stock Return Year t+2 uses 24 consecutive monthly stock returns. The 
independent variables are changes in three functional productivity measures between year t+1 and year t-1, their 
interaction terms, and the lagged stock return. All the serial correlation and instrument validity tests support the use 
of GMM model proposed. 
 
 Theoretical valuation for the negative association between marketing productivity and 
firm value is that the financial markets selectively perceive information contained in marketing 
investment about the future marketing productivity, and resultant, future firm value. Investors, 
acknowledging the law of diminishing returns, may place less weight on the potential changes in 
productivity because they believe that productivity reduction is inevitable during the merger 
process and, as such, productivity adjustment may be less indicative of future prospects. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, investors view an increase in marketing investment as a credible tool 
managers can use in order to reduce the degree of information asymmetry and to maintain 
competitive advantage, especially in the post-merger period. 
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 The financial market’s tendency to selectively incorporate information appears isolated 
from the marketing investment. The results of Table 12 present a positive and statistically 
significant effect of operation productivity score (year t+1: 0.0472, year t+2: 0.0332), suggesting 
that investors do not react favorably to the reduction in operation productivity shown in Table 11. 
Furthermore, looking at the interaction term with marketing productivity (year t+1: 0.0561, year 
t+2: 0.0271), the positive impact of improvements in operations dominates, despite the negative 
main effect of marketing productivity score. These results suggest that the most significant 
determinant of firm value in a merger is the interaction of marketing and operation productivity. 
This is also in accordance with findings from the marketing literature that firms in relatively 
stable-technology market need to excel at two functional areas: a firm’s capability to exploit the 
benefits by meeting customers’ need and preference, and a firm’s capability to produce products 
with minimum costs. The results presented here support the view that highlights the importance 
of marketing and operation functions in the chemical and rubbers, and electronic equipment and 
automotive industries. In addition, results show a significant persistence in stock prices (year t+1: 
0.0328, year t+2: 0.0223), as expected. These results echo what is found in the marketing 
literature.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
Discussion 
The current study explores the links between an acquirer’s marketing investment, 
marketing productivity, and financial market value in the chemical and rubbers, and electronic 
equipment and automotive markets, where mergers are expected to change the whole outlook of 
an acquirer and its industry. Cobb-Douglas production function, DEA productivity indices, and 
GMM estimation techniques are used to generate inferences. The results show that acquirers, on 
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average, decrease their marketing investment post-merger; however, at the same time, increases 
in marketing are associated with increases in sales. Increased focus on marketing, in some cases, 
would result in a drop in marketing productivity, which positively affects investors’ expectation 
in the stock market. The results show that increases in marketing investments are associated with 
higher stock returns. This suggests that the investors are appreciative of the signalling role of 
increased marketing investment. The investors view firms who spend more on marketing post-
merger as having greater future cash inflow and growth opportunity. These results underscore the 
importance of marketing in ensuring success not only in the product market but also in the 
financial market.  
 
Theoretical Implications 
Several different measures have been utilized to estimate an agent’s productivity. A 
common method is to calibrate an indirect estimate using survey approach. I investigate the 
relations among investment, productivity, and firm value by employing the DEA model as a 
platform to obtain measures of productivity in relation to that of rivals in the same industry. 
Estimating a construct such as productivity is difficult because any set of methods is unlikely to 
manifest the elements completely. To address this issue, I assess the productivity in three 
different functional areas areas—marketing, R&D, and operation—and utilize several different 
sets of input resources and output variables. In addition, I use the GMM modelling in order to 
control for heterogeneity and endogeneity simultaneously. A clear benefit of controlling for 
heterogeneity and endogeneity is the estimation of unbiased coefficients from the model. Using 
the Cobb-Douglas production function, DEA productivity indices, and GMM estimation 
techniques, I quantify the effects of marketing investment and productivity on firm value. 
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Managerial Implications 
I provide several managerial guidelines. First, the DEA approach demonstrates a 
comprehensive analysis that can offer strategic directions to managers in allocating their limited 
resources post-merger. The analysis reported simultaneously investigates all of the critical 
relations between inputs, outputs, and stock returns. Depending on the individual acquirer’s 
business environment, managers may make decisions in terms of marketing investment to 
increase sales and stock prices, believing that marketing assets will have a significantly positive 
impact on firm performance. In a review of a randomly chosen firm described in previous 
sections, a hypothetical increase in marketing investment leads to a ~1 percent increase in sales 
and a ~3.03 percent increase in stock return. This input-output relation that the DEA model 
explicitly focuses on provides specific implementation guidance to managers. Adopting an 
approach that focused either on input-minimization or output-maximization may be an extra 
reason why some acquirers in the sample are classified as inefficient relative to close rivals. In 
the post-merger period, seeking to strike the right balance between revenue expansion and 
efficiency improvement simultaneously becomes more important. Next, the results may provide 
managers with justification for marketing investment. Investors in the financial market place a 
significant positive weight on a firm’s marketing strategy. However, many firms appear to not 
emphasize the implications of marketing, presumably due to the difficulty of measuring the 
returns from marketing investments. Results from the current study show that in some cases, 
firms may be inefficient in distributing input resources because they may have been consistently 
underinvesting in marketing or other functional areas. Firms that fail to allocate sufficient key 
input resources to produce key outputs cannot be expected to outperform their rivals in the 
market.  
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Limitations 
This study has several limitations. First, the data are collected from one point in time. It 
would be preferable to test long-terms effects and productivity changes by using multi-period 
data. Such investigation is needed to study overall impacts surrounding the relation between 
investment, productivity, and firm value. Similarly, adopting alternative measures for firm value 
such as customer satisfaction is a natural research avenue. Furthermore, addressing other 
industries where R&D assets are of special interest (e.g., computers and electronics) would be 
worthwhile. The DEA approach also has limitations. There may be measurement error in the 
inputs and outputs as accounting information available contains measurement error. The DEA 
estimates are imperfect in that the specification and the choice of input and output variables can 
be subjective. Future research should refine variables in analysing effects.  
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CHAPTER 4 – ESSAY 3: STOCK MARKET REACTION TO MERGER 
ANNOUNCEMENT AND MARKETING INVESTMENTS POST-MERGER 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 In the previous chapters, I explore the links between marketing investment, marketing 
productivity, and a firm’s financial value. The results show that increasing marketing investment 
is more likely to lower the level of marketing productivity, but this low productivity tends to 
achieve higher stock prices. This juxtaposition could lead to difficult decisions for the marketing 
manager. However, mergers often lead to acquirers’ disinvestment in their marketing post-
merger relative to a firm’s rivals. The situation prompts following questions: Do the firms ignore 
the consequences of spending less in marketing post-merger? What factors drive post-merger 
marketing investment decisions? 
Researchers have documented a significant correlation between corporate investment 
decisions and stock prices (Mizik and Jacobson 2007; Chakravarty and Grewal 2011; Mizik 
2010). The underlying rationale is that the past behavior of a firm’s stock creates investors’ 
expectations and affects managers’ decisions. Specifically, the stock returns and volatility signal 
managers about the quality of their decisions, especially when investors believe these managerial 
decisions are poor. As a result, managers use the information contained in a firm’s stock 
movements when making investment decisions. Accordingly, the objective of the current chapter 
is to empirically examine the relationship between corporate investment decisions and stock 
prices in a merger context. I explore whether the acquirers’ post-merger investment decisions are 
indeed influenced by the stock returns and stock volatility at the time of merger announcements.  
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To do this, I require a measure of the post-merger investment decision and a measure of 
the stock market reaction to a merger announcement. In order to comprehend the post-merger 
investment decision, I categorize acquirers into four groups based on the pattern of marketing 
and R&D investments. Firms are grouped depending on whether they spend more or less than the 
industry average in marketing and R&D. In order to estimate the stock market reaction, I use 
both stock returns and stock volatility at the time of a merger announcement (Mizik and 
Jacobson 2007; Chakravarty and Grewal 2011). The merger announcement return is calculated 
as the market-adjusted, three-day (-1, +1) cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around a merger 
announcement. The stock volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the merger 
announcement return. I collect the sample from the Securities Data Corporation’s U.S. M&A 
database (SDC). I identify mergers and acquisitions announced between 1990 and 2010 that meet 
several criteria: 1) both the acquirer and the target are U.S. public companies, 2) the acquirer has 
annual financial statement information available from COMPUSTAT of Standard & Poor’s and 
stock returns data from the Chicago Booth’s Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), 3) 
the acquisition is completed, and 4) the acquirer obtains 100 percent of the target. Merging the 
SDC M&A, COMPUSTAT, and CRSP data samples yields an unbalanced pooled cross-sectional 
time series panel with a total of 2,514 observations.  
I find that both merger announcement return and its volatility predict an acquirer’s post-
merger investment patterns. Acquirers extract information from the financial market reaction and 
consider it when making corporate investment decisions. I show that a negative reaction to a 
merger announcement leads to a superior investment in marketing relative to rivals and inferior 
investment in R&D post-merger. In addition, the results show that the relationship varies with 
the volatility of merger announcement return, suggesting that firms have a stronger incentive to 
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use information contained in the stock fluctuation as the degree of information is higher. The 
results are consistent with the contingent role of information asymmetry found in Chapters 2 and 
3.  
 
4.2 Conceptual Framework 
 
Why Do Acquirers React to the Stock Market Reaction? 
In this study, I empirically assess whether the stock returns and stock volatility drive 
managerial investment decisions post-merger. I do so by examining the links between a merger 
announcement return and its standard deviation, and patterns of post-merger marketing and R&D 
investments. Thus, I test whether information flows from the financial market to the acquiring 
firm manager and whether managers extract information from the investors’ reaction to a merger 
announcement. The hypothesis implies that the stock market possesses information that is new to 
firms and helps managers improve their investments in marketing and R&D. Although managers 
are generally better informed than investors about the fundamental and prospects of a firm, I 
argue that, at the time of a merger announcement, the financial market has more information that 
managers do not know (Luo 2005; Chen et al. 2007). When a merger is announced, investors 
may not agree with the proposed merger because they believe that the total value of 1 combined 
entity will be reduced. This information is more likely to be related to a weakness of the merger 
plan the acquirer has overlooked, such as the potential competition following a post-merger 
integration or the potential demand shift for the merged firm’s products or services. In addition, 
often only a group of top managers are involved in a merger decision. In this environment, 
institutional investors and analysts can be better positioned to understand the entire outlook of a 
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firm and its industry, while considering relevant micro- and macroeconomic factors.16 Hence, the 
transmission of information from the financial market to managers is expected to occur at the 
time of a merger announcement, which, in turn, influences an acquirer’s post-merger investment 
patterns.  
 
Related Studies and Contribution 
This study relates to the literature in marketing and finance that explores a correlation 
between stock market reactions and corporate investments. In marketing, studies have shown that 
firms react to past stock returns and volatility in the form of unexpected adjustments in 
marketing and R&D (Mizik and Jacobson 2007; Chakravarty and Grewal 2011; Mizik 2010). 
However, the evidence has shown mixed results regarding whether the unanticipated change in 
investments is a consequence of positive or negative financial market performance. For example, 
Chakravarty and Grewal (2011) find that firms increase their marketing investments to maintain 
or further increase their positive stock returns and volatility. On the other hand, Mizik and 
Jacobson (2007) find that managers have “myopic” incentives to cut their investments in an 
effort to meet investors’ short-term expectations. Prior research has been unable to provide an 
unambiguous explanation because there are incentives promoting both “increase” and “decrease” 
investment in order to enhance firm value. This study contributes to the literature by focusing on 
the competitive nature of marketing and R&D investments. As previously shown in Chapters 2 
and 3, when budgeting an acquirer’s marketing and R&D, considering the competition plays a 
critical role in enhancing firm value post-merger. Superior marketing investment relative to 
rivals is more likely to achieve higher stock prices, although spending more tends to lower the 
                                                 
16 This may explain why a number of mergers or acquisitions experience poor performance post-merger (Sorescu et 
al. 2007; Swaminathan et al. 2008). More than half of the acquirers in my sample exhibit negative announcement 
returns.  
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level of marketing productivity. On the managerial level, a merger time period is one of the most 
difficult situation to determine the level of marketing and R&D investments (Sorescu et al. 2007; 
Swaminathan et al. 2008). Because a merger combines two firms into one entity neither 
managers nor investors know what to expect in terms of the magnitude of corporate investment 
adjustments post-merger. This difficulty leads to a situation in which an acquirer’s willingness to 
spend more or less relative to rivals becomes a more effective signal as a response to stock 
market reactions.  
In the broader literature in finance, studies have shown that managers “learn” from the 
stock market and “use” this information when making investment decisions (Durnev et al. 2004; 
Luo 2005; Chen et al. 2007). The underlying rationale is that one of the fundamental roles of the 
financial market is to produce and aggregate of information, and this information is transmitted 
to managers via the trading process. Then this transmitted information can guide managers to 
make decisions in corporate investment. The investors can have an impact on the real economy 
through this mechanism, especially when they have no communication channels with managers. 
Durnev et al. (2004) and Chen et al. (2007) study the informativeness of stock returns by 
measuring stock price co-movements between a focal firm and the industry as a whole and by 
measuring the probability of informed trading based on the daily buy-and-sell orders. In addition, 
two studies have investigated the hypotheses related to this study in a merger context (Jennings 
and Mazzeo 1991; Luo 2005). While Jennings and Mazzeo (1991) do not find a significant 
relation, Luo (2005) shows the positive correlation between the acquirer’s stock returns around 
the merger announcement and the completion of mergers. In contrast, I study the post-merger 
corporate investment pattern in marketing and R&D, rather than the acquirer’s merger closing 
decision. I also study both stock returns and stock volatility around a merger announcement. The 
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examination of both stock returns and stock volatility allows for inferences to be drawn about 
whether and how the evaluation of investors about the proposed merger deal and the degree of 
information asymmetry in the stock market affect managerial investment decisions.  
I believe above conceptual arguments justify the test of stock returns and volatility 
around a merger as a driver of the post-merger investment decisions. However, existing research 
(Mizik and Jacobson 2007; Chakravarty and Grewal 2011; Mizik 2010) suggests that there are 
incentives working to promote both directions—spending “more” or “less” relative to rivals in 
marketing and R&D post-merger—as a response to the financial market reaction. Therefore, 
while I investigate the relationship based on the indirect empirical evidence and theoretical 
conjecture the previous studies provide, it remains a matter of empirical investigation to 
determine the sign and magnitude of the effects. 
 
4.3 Empirical Analysis and Results 
 
Empirical Analysis 
To test the potential reaction of firms to the stock market, I build on a regression of the 
post-merger investment decision on the stock returns and stock volatility at the time of a merger 
announcement. I use the following probit model: 
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡+1
= 𝛽0 +  𝛽1 ∗ 𝑁𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑁𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡                
+  𝛽4 ∗  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                               (8) 
where i stands for firm, t for time (year). The dependent variable, 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡+1, is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer spends more than the industry average in which a firm 
operates and 0 otherwise. I use two different measures for the dependent variable: 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡+1, measured as an acquirer’s advertising expenditure scaled by total assets in the 
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year following a merger announcement; and 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡+1, measured as a firm’s R&D expenditure 
scaled by total assets in the year following a merger announcement. Industries are identified 
using two-digit SIC codes. NAnnRet is a dummy equal to 1 if the merger announcement return is 
negative and 0 otherwise. The merger announcement return is calculated as the market-adjusted, 
three-day (-1, +1) cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around a merger announcement. The 
CRSP value-weighted index is used as a proxy for the market portfolio. A negative 
announcement return serves as a proxy for the pressure faced by managers because a negative 
reaction reveals that investors disagree with the proposed merger. AnnVol is measured as the 
standard deviation of the market-adjusted, three-day (-1, +1) cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
around a merger announcement. A volatile reaction in the financial market at the time of merger 
announcement suggests that the degree of information asymmetry is higher for the merger. 
Control consists of a vector of the merger- and firm-specific characteristics that are expected to 
co-vary with the acquirers’ investment decisions: merger type, cashpmt, lagged sales, lagged 
ROA, lagged investment in marketing and R&D, lagged stock returns and stock volatility, 
financial flexibility, size, book-to-market ratio, market share, industry, and year. All control 
variables are defined as illustrated in Chapters 2 and 3. In equation (8), 𝛽1, 𝛽2, and 𝛽3 are the 
primary interests. 
 
Sample 
I collect the sample from the Securities Data Corporation’s U.S. M&A database (SDC). I 
identify mergers and acquisitions announced between 1990 and 2010 that meet several criteria: 1) 
both the acquirer and the target are U.S. public companies, 2) the acquirer has annual financial 
statement information available from COMPUSTAT of Standard & Poor’s and stock returns data 
from the Chicago Booth’s Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), 3) the acquisition is 
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completed, and 4) the acquirer obtains 100 percent of the target. The data treatment and merging 
procedure closely parallel those in the prior literature.17 Merging the SDC M&A, COMPUSTAT, 
and CRSP data samples yield an unbalanced pooled cross-sectional time series panel with a total 
of 2,514 observations.  
 
Results 
 Table 13 summarizes the market reaction to the merger announcements. The market-
adjusted, three-day (-1, +1) cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of both merging firms (the 
acquirer and target) around a merger announcement are presented. The Combined announcement 
CAR is the value-weighted average of the acquirer’s and the target’s announcement CARs. More 
than half of the mergers exhibit stock returns loss at the time of merger announcement. The 
Combined announcement CAR is negative in 56.42 percent of the sample. Only 18.34 percent  of 
the targets have negative announcement returns while 60.72 percent  of the acquirers have 
positive announcement returns. The acquirer returns dominate the combined returns because the 
acquirers are usually larger than the target firms.  
Table 13 
Descriptive Statistics of the Merger Announcement Returns  
  
Mean SD 
Frequency 
< 0 
Correlation with 
(2) Acquirer's 
Ann. CAR 
(3) Target's 
Ann. CAR 
(1) Combined announcement CAR  -0.76%  9.81% 56.42% 0.89 0.49 
(2) Acquirer’s announcement CAR  -2.34% 10.02% 60.72% 
 
0.23 
(3) Target’s announcement CAR 18.96% 31.68% 18.34% 
  Note: This table summarizes the market reaction to the merger announcements. The market-adjusted, three-day (-1, 
+1) cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of both merging firms (acquirer and target) around a merger announcement 
are presented separately and combined. The Combined announcement CAR is the value-weighted average of the 
acquirer’s and the target’s announcement CARs. 
                                                 
17 I retain only the biggest transaction in terms of deal value to eliminate the confounding effects of sequential 
mergers. In addition, the final sample is limited to mergers with deal value greater than $10 million. The final 
sample consists of mergers across all industries to preserve reliable and generalizable results. The result is not 
sensitive to the inclusion of the financial sector. 
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 Table 14 describes the relationship between the stock market reaction around a merger 
announcement, both the combined announcement CAR (column 2) and its volatility (column 5), 
and the post-merger marketing and R&D investment patterns. In addition, this table shows the 
frequency of investment patterns among firms with negative (column 3) and positive (column 4) 
combined announcement CAR. The results show that the merger announcement returns predict 
the post-merger investment patterns. The average combined announcement return for acquirers 
spending less relative to rivals in both marketing and R&D is significant and negative (-1.52%). 
The mean combined announcement return is also significantly negative (-1.77%) for acquirers 
spending less in marketing but more in R&D. The mean announcement returns for other two 
groups of acquirers with different investment patterns are statistically insignificant (0.43 and 
0.08%). The results suggest that companies spend less in marketing more often when the merger 
announcement return is negative. Furthermore, when the merger announcement return is 
negative, approximately 81 percent of acquirers (37+43%) spend less in R&D and 53 percent 
(37+16%) spend less in marketing. Of the sample acquirers, 37 percent spend less in marketing 
and R&D simultaneously. This shows that a significant proportion of firms appear to be 
spending less in either marketing or R&D, or both, as a response to negative stock market 
reaction. Finally, the average stock volatility (AnnVol) is generally higher for acquirers spending 
more in marketing (10.70 and 11.53%) than for acquirers spending less in marketing (7.49 and 
8.78%). The differences are statistically significant at the 5-percent level. The results imply that 
companies spend more in marketing relative to rivals when there is a higher degree of 
information asymmetry at the time of a merger announcement. The results are consistent with the 
notion that managers extract information contained in stock movements and consider it when 
making forward-looking investment decisions. 
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Table 14 
Reaction to the Merger Announcement and Post-Merger Investment patterns 
  
Mean 
Combined 
Ann. CAR 
(t-statistics) 
Among Firms 
with  
NEGATIVE 
Combined  
Ann. CAR 
Among Firms 
with  
POSITIVE 
Combined  
Ann. CAR  
Mean 
AnnVol 
(t-statistics) 
Spending LESS relative to rivals  
in both Marketing and R&D  
  -1.52% 
(-2.173) 
37% 11% 7.49% 
Spending LESS in Marketing 
but MORE in R&D 
  0.43% 
(-1.326) 
16% 17% 8.78% 
Spending MORE in Marketing 
but LESS in R&D 
 -1.77% 
(-2.218) 
43% 19% 10.70% 
Spending MORE relative to rivals 
in both MKT and R&D  
  0.08% 
(-0.982) 
4% 52% 11.53% 
Note: This table summarizes the relation between the stock market reaction around a merger announcement, both the 
combined announcement CAR (column 2) and its volatility (column 5), and the post-merger marketing and R&D 
investment patterns. In addition, this table shows the frequency of investment patterns among firms with negative 
(column 3) and positive (column 4) combined announcement CAR. Combined announcement CAR is the value-
weighted average of the acquirer’s and the target’s announcement CAR’s. AnnVol is the standard deviation of the 
Combined announcement CAR. The CRSP value-weighted index is used as a proxy for the market portfolio.  
 
 Table 15 presents the probit regression estimation results of the post-merger marketing 
and R&D investment patterns on the stock returns and stock volatility. The dependent variable 
for columns (1) and (2) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer spends more in marketing 
than the industry average in which a firm operates and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable for 
columns (3) and (4) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer spends more in R&D relative 
to rivals and 0 otherwise. NAnnRet is a dummy equal to 1 if the combined merger announcement 
CAR is negative and 0 otherwise. Acquirer’s NAnnRet (Target’s NAnnRet) is a dummy equal to 
1 if the acquirer’s (target’s) merger announcement CAR is negative and 0 otherwise. I use the 
NAnnRet as an independent variable in columns (1) and (3) and both the Acquirer’s NAnnRet and 
Target’s NAnnRet in columns (2) and (4). AnnVol is the standard deviation of NAnnRet in 
columns (1) and (3) and the standard deviation of Acquirer’s NAnnRet in columns (2) and (4). 
NAnnRet, Acquirer’s NAnnRet, Target’s NAnnRet, and AnnVol represent the financial market 
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reaction. Consistent with the previous univariate tests, the financial market reaction predicts the 
patterns of marketing and R&D investments. 
 
Table 15 
Probit Regression Estimation Results: Post-Merger Marketing and R&D Investment Patterns on 
the Stock Return and Stock Volatility 
  
Dependent Variable 
Spending MORE in  
Marketing 
 
Spending MORE in  
R&D 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
NAnnRet (Negative Announcement Return) 
     1.150** 
  
 -0.545*  
 (0.460) 
  
(0.321)  
Acquirer's NAnnRet 
 
   1.151* 
 
  -0.514** 
 
 (0.609) 
 
     (0.057) 
Target's NAnnRet 
 
    -0.003 
 
     -0.004 
 
    (0.816) 
 
     (0.747) 
AnnVol (Announcement Volatility) 
     2.041***      2.375*** 
 
     -0.357     -0.119 
(0.001)     (0.000) 
 
(0.252)     (0.632) 
NAnnRet* AnnVol 
     4.286*** 
  
     -1.351*** 
     (0.806) 
  
(0.005) 
 
Acquirer's NAnnRet * AnnVol 
      3.902*** 
  
    -1.022*** 
     (0.616) 
  
(0.027) 
Target's NAnnRet * AnnVol 
      -0.259 
  
    -0.196 
 
(0.209) 
  
    (0.390) 
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 
Note: This table summarizes the probit regresstion estimation results of the post-merger marketing and R&D 
investment patterns on the stock returns and stock volatility. The dependent variable for columns (1) and (2) is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer spends less in marketing than the industry average in which a firm 
operates and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable for columns (3) and (4) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
acquirer spends less in R&D relative to rivals and 0 otherwise. NAnnRet is a dummy equal to 1 if the combined 
merger announcement CAR is negative and 0 otherwise. Acquirer’s NAnnRet (Target’s NAnnRet) is a dummy equal 
to 1 if the acquirer’s (target’s) merger announcement CAR is negative and 0 otherwise. I use the NAnnRet as an 
independent variable in columns (1) and (3) and both the Acquirer’s NAnnRet and Target’s NAnnRet in columns (2) 
and (4). AnnVol is the standard deviation of NAnnRet in columns (1) and (3) and the standard deviation of 
Acquirer’s NAnnRet in columns (2) and (4). 
 
 Interpretation of the coefficients in probit regression is not as straightforward as the 
interpretations of coefficients in linear regression. The increase in probability attributed to a one-
unit increase in a given predictor is dependent on both the values of the other predictors and the 
starting value of the given predictors. However, there are limited ways in which one can interpret 
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the individual regression coefficients. A positive (negative) coefficient means that an increase in 
the predictor leads to an increase (decrease) in the predicted probability. For example, the 
coefficient of NAnnRet in column (1) is 1.150 (p < 0.05), suggesting that the negative stock 
returns at the time of a merger announcement increases the probability of spending more in 
marketing relative to rivals post-merger. The coefficient of NAnnRet in column (3) is -0.545 (p < 
0.10), suggesting that the negative merger announcement return decreases the probability of 
spending more in R&D post-merger. Taken together, the results suggest that a negative investors’ 
reaction to a merger proposal is more likely to associate with a superior marketing investment 
and an inferior R&D investment post-merger. This is contrast with Chakravarty and Grewal 
(2011), who find that an increase in stock returns leads to an unanticipated increase in marketing 
and an unanticipated decrease in R&D simultaneously. Table 15 also shows that an increase in 
stock volatility (AnnVol) increases the probability of spending more in marketing (column (1): 
2.041 and column (2): 2.375). Furthermore, the positive coefficient of the interaction between 
NAnnRet and AnnVol (4.286) suggests that the negative reaction from the stock market further 
increases the probability of spending more in marketing, when a higher degree of information 
asymmetry exists. These results echo what is found in Chapters 2 and 3 in that managers view 
marketing investment as an effective tool to deliver positive signal to investors. When investors 
express their opposition to the proposed merger deal via unfavorable announcement returns, 
managers seek to prove that the merger transaction is, in fact, value-enhancing through 
aggressive marketing strategy. Finally, the interaction of NAnnRet and AnnVol (column (3): -
1.351) has a significant and negative impact, despite the insignificant main effect of AnnVol 
(column (3): -0.357). The results suggests that the higher stock volatility drives managers to 
  
84 
further cut their R&D investments as a response to a negative investors’ reaction to a merger 
announcement.18  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
Discussion 
The objective of this study is to examine the factors that drive an acquirer’s marketing 
and R&D investment decisions in a merger context. I empirically examine the relationship 
between stock returns and stock volatility, and the post-merger corporate investment patterns. I 
explore whether an acquirer’s post-merger investment decisions to spend more or less than their 
industry rivals are indeed influenced by the stock market reaction at the time of merger 
announcement. I find that both merger announcement return and its volatility predict an 
acquirer’s post-merger investment patterns. Acquirers extract information from the financial 
market reaction and consider it when making corporate investment decisions. By using a probit 
regression, I show that a negative reaction to a merger announcement leads to a superior 
investment in marketing relative to rivals and inferior investment in R&D post-merger. In 
addition, the results show that the relationship varies with the volatility of merger announcement 
return, suggesting that firms have a stronger incentive to use information contained in the stock 
movements when the degree of information is higher. The results are consistent with the 
contingent role of information asymmetry found in Chapters 2 and 3.  
 
Limitations 
This study has several limitations. First, the data used in this study are collected on an 
annual basis. It would be preferable to test shorter-term effects by using quarterly data. Next, the 
                                                 
18  The overall results remain the same with the use of Acquirer's NAnnRet but not with Target's NAnnRet, 
suggesting that the combined merger announcement return and stock volatility are better determinants of the 
acquirers’ post-merger investment patterns than the individual firm measures. 
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use of advertising expenditure as a proxy is limited. Although I believe advertising captures a 
more relevant facet of marketing in a merger context (McAlister et al. 2007), it would be 
worthwhile to examine the importance of marketing in several directions. Furthermore, 
addressing other contexts (e.g., equity issuing events or product recalls) would be worthwhile 
(Mizik and Jacobson 2007; Gao et al. 2015). Finally, investigating the possibility of trade-offs in 
marketing and R&D investment and its impact on firm performance would be an interesting 
avenue to pursue (Chakravarty and Grewal 2011). 
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